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Joint and Survivor Annuities 
Under ERISA The Gamble 
on Survival 
JOHN W. LEE * 
Background 
Prior to the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (ERISA) the law required vesting of employee benefits 
only at normal retirement age' and upon termination of the plan or com-
plete discontinuance of contributions 2; it did not require a survivor 
benefit if a participant's death occurred prior to his normal retire-
ment age, nor a survivor benefit if a participant died while his benefit 
was in pay status." Most prior Internal Revenue Service development 
concerned whether a distribution of benefits to a beneficiary was 
incidental to the required primary purpose of paying a benefit to the 
participant.' 
Defined contribution plans" prior to ERISA commonly provided, 
* John W. Lee (B.A., University of North Carolina, 1965; LL.B., University 
of Virginia, 1968; LL.M. (Taxation) Georgetown University, 1970) is a member 
of the Virginia and North Carolina Bars and is a member of the firm of Hirschler, 
Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, Richmond, Va. 
This article is based upon a speech given at the ALI-ABA Course of Study: 
Pension, Profit-Sharing and Other Deferred Compensation Plans, Oct. 10, 1975 
and Jan. 23, 1976. The author acknowledges with gratitude the comments and 
advice of Mark S. Dray, member of the Virginia Bar, in the preparation of the 
speech. 
1 Pub. 778, Pt. 5(c)(2) (Feb. 1972). 
2 I.R.C. § 401(a)(7), as amended by Pub. L. 87-792 § 2 (now I.R.C. §§ 
40l(a)(7) and 411(d)(3)). 
3 H.R. Rep. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1974) (reproduced in 
App. B) (hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep. No. 93-807). 
4 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 72-241, 1972-1 C.B. 108; Rev. Rul. 72-240, 1972-1 
C.B. 108. 
The term "defined contribution plan" is defined in I.R.C. § 414(i) as "a 
plan which provides for an individual account for each participant and for benefits 
based solely on the amount contributed to the participant's account, and any 
income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other 
participants which may be allocated to such participant's account." See also 
ERISA § 3(34) (assigning the same definition to "individual account plan"). 
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although there was no explicit requirement to do so, that a participant's 
account was fully vested upon his death or disability prior to normal 
retirement age and in these two events his account was payable to his 
beneficiary. The probable source for this practice was Treasury Regu-
lations Section 1.401-4(a) (1) (ii), which defines a profit-sharing plan 
as a plan providing for distributions of benefits "after a fixed number 
of years, the attainment of a stated age, or upon the prior occurrence 
of some event such as illness, disability, retirement, death, layoff, or 
Defined contribution or individual account plans encompass primarily three 
types: 
(1) Profit-sharing plans are defined in Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (1) (ii) as plans 
established and maintained by employers to provide for employee participation 
in the profits by establishing a definite predetermined formula for allocating the 
contributions made to the plan among the participants and for distributing the 
funds accumulated at a stated number of years, at the attainment of a stated age, 
or on the occurrence of some stated event, such as lay-off, illness, disability, 
retirement, death, severance of employment, hardship, or participation for a 
stated number of years (at least two). 
(2) Money-purchase pension plans are distinguished in Reg. § 1.401-1(b) 
(1)(i) from defined benefit pension plans, discussed in note 7 infra, on the basis 
that the "definitely determinable benefits" prerequisite of a pension plan is satisfied 
in a money-purchase pension plan by the contributions merely being fixed without 
being geared to profits; whereas, in a defined benefit pension plan, contributions to 
the plan must be determined actuarially on the basis of definitely determinable 
benefits. In essence, a money-purchase pension plan is a separate account plan 
just as a profit-sharing plan, but 
(a) the formula for making contributions cannot be varied from year to 
year (contributions are usually determined as a specified flat amount or 
a level percentage of each participant's compensation); 
(b) contributions must be made regardless of whether there are profits; 
(c) forfeitures must be used to reduce required employer contributions, 
whereas, in a profit-sharing plan, forfeitures may be added to the par-
ticipants' accounts in addition to any employer contributions (see Lee, 
Slabaugh & Fogg, "Basics of Employee Benefit Plans," 27th Va. Conf. 
Fed. Tax. 72-73 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Lee, Slabaugh & Fogg)); 
and 
(d) the deductible contribution under profit-sharing plans is limited (except 
for unused credit carryforwards) to 15 percent of compensation of the 
covered participants (I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)). 
There is no deductible limitation as such on contributions to money-purchase 
pension plans, but the I.R.C. § 415 per-participant limitation of annual additions 
to the lesser of 25 percent of compensation or $25,000 (adjusted by a cost of 
living escalator) imposes an effective limitation of 25 percent of compensation as 
to deductions to a money-purchase pension plan. This mirrors prior administrative 
practice under which, as a rule of thumb for advance-determination letter pur-
poses, the Service prior to ERISA had taken the position that a contribution not 
in excess of 25 percent of annual compensation on an overall basis would be 
generally acceptable under money-purchase pension plans. See Address by 
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severance of employment. . . ." The regulations`' also seem to have 
recognized the difference in practice between defined benefit 7 and 
defined contribution plans. Defined contribution plans also frequently 
offered payment of a participant's account balance in the plan at retire-
ment under several options, usually including (1) a lump-sum distri-
bution; or (2) the application of the account balance to the purchase of 
Isadore Goodman, Q&A, 4 P-H Pension & Profit-Sharing Rep. ¶ 19,054.19, at 
19,755 (1975) (Addresses by Isadore Goodman on Qualified Pension and Profit-
Sharing Plans under the Internal Revenue Code Between Oct. 20, 1955 and Oct. 
5, 1970.) Where a participant was sufficiently old so that a larger contribution 
would not yield a benefit actuarially determined in excess of 100 percent of com-
pensation, larger contributions were allowed. The author is aware of a pre-ERISA 
qualified money-purchase pension plan, in which all of the participants were 
within ten years of normal retirement age and which provided for contributions 
equal to 100 percent of compensation. The advance-determination letter contained 
a caveat that benefits at normal retirement age could not exceed 100 percent of 
compensation. 
(3) Stock bonus plans are defined in Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(iii) as plans that 
provide benefits similar to those of profit-sharing plans, except that (1) the con-
tributions made by the employers are not necessarily dependent upon profits; and 
(2) the benefits must be distributed in the form of stock of the employer com-
panies. For purposes of allocating and distributing the stock of the employers, 
such plans are subject to the same requirements as profit-sharing plans. See 
generally Lee, Slabaugh & Fogg at 76-77. 
6 Compare Reg. § 1.401-7(a), with Reg. § 1.401-4(a) (1) (iii). 
7 I.R.C. § 414(j) defines "defined benefit plan" as any plan that is not a 
defined contribution plan. See also ERISA § 3(35). Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (1) (i) 
defines a "pension plan" (which in this context is synonymous with a defined 
benefit pension plan) as a plan established and maintained by an employer pri-
marily to systematically provide for the payment of "definitely determinable 
benefits" to employees over a period of years—usually for life—after retirement. 
Thus, a defined benefit pension plan cannot provide for a lump-sum cash distribu-
tion as the sole mode of payment. Pub. 778, Pt. 2(u) (Feb. 1972). On the 
other hand, it is probable that a defined benefit pension plan does not have to 
provide for payment of retirement benefits for life after retirement. Probably, such 
a plan could provide a term certain annuity as the sole method of payment. The 
definitely determinable benefit formula generally is based on such factors as 
years of service and compensation received by the employee. Determination of 
the amount of retirement benefits and the contributions actuarially determined 
as necessary to provide such benefits cannot be dependent upon profits. Further-
more, the IRS has long taken the position that benefits are not definitely determin-
able if forfeitures may be used to provide increased benefits for the remaining 
participants. See Reg. § 1.401-7(a). In summary, a plan designed to provide 
retirement benefits for employees to be paid upon retirement or over a period 
of years after retirement will be considered for Treasury purposes a "pension 
plan" (i.e., a defined benefit pension plan), if the employer contributions under 
the plan can be determined actuarially on the basis of definitely determinable 
benefits. There is a brief discussion of how contributions are actuarially de-
termined in note 8 infra. 
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(a) a straight life annuity, (b) a term certain annuity, or (c) a joint 
and survivor annuity; or (3 ) a combination of the above options. In 
practical effect then, such plans did provide for survivor benefits prior 
to retirement, albeit usually not in an annuity form—the account 
balance. Since most defined contribution plan participants elected a 
lump-sum distribution at retirement, the effect in practice was that the 
plan provided no postretirement survivor benefit. Of course, the par-
ticipant had received the full amount of retirement benefit or account 
regardless of life span after retirement so that there was no element of 
gambling on surviving in order to receive the full value of retirement 
benefits. However, from a social policy viewpoint of protecting the 
surviving spouse by dividing the participant's benefit with the spouse, 
this practice was not desirable. 
In contrast, defined benefit plans, particularly of larger em-
ployers, frequently provided for a retirement benefit only if the par-
ticipant survived to normal retirement age. Moreover, such retirement 
benefit generally was paid in the form of a straight life annuity, and, 
when the participant died, no survivor annuity was available for the 
surviving spouse. Frequently, larger defined benefit plans, in making 
the actuarial assumptions that went into establishing the amount neces-
sary for the employer to contribute to the plan in order to fund the 
payment of its promised benefit, discounted in advance for the actuarial 
probabilities that some participants would die prior to attaining normal 
retirement age under the plan and also took into effect only the par-
ticipants' life expectancies after retirement in computing the amount 
or cost of the final benefit. 8 Thus, under such plans, a participant had 
8 In determining actuarially employer costs, the actuary always considers 
interest (i.e., earnings on the plan trust fund), postretirement mortality, and 
usually, in larger plans, preretirement mortality and turnover. The following 
factors in the past have been acceptable to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
Service as actuarial "assumptions": (1) mortality; (2) investment return or in-
terest; (3) expenses of operation; (4) turnover of employees (i.e., separation from 
service prior to full vesting or prior to full accrual of the maximum benefit under 
the plan); (5) retirement ages; and (6) change in way of compensation. See 
Lee, Slabaugh & Fogg at 81. See also "Bulletin on Section 23(p) (1)(A) and (B) 
of I.R.C. (1939)," Pt. VII (1945), reprinted in 2 P-H Pension & Profit-Sharing 
Rep. ¶ 69,602 (1975). 
The following illustration of simple actuarial assumptions contained in Lee, 
Slabaugh & Fogg at 81-82, is derived from P-H Pension & Profit-Sharing Rep-
Explanation ¶ 2,143 (1975): 
"Assume John Smith is 35 years of age and his employer wants to provide 
him upon retirement with a monthly life income of $100 a month. Assume 
further that the trustee will purchase annuities when the employee reaches 
normal retirement age (65) and that at that time such annuity would cost 
$15,000. The employer must accumulate this $15,000 over a period of 30 
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to live to normal retirement age to obtain any benefit, and it cut off 
at death. Where plans had made such actuarial assumptions, separate 
death benefits might be provided through insurance or self-insurance.' 
Congress noted that the above (defined benefit) situation could 
result in a hardship where an individual primarily dependent upon 
his pension as a source of retirement income was unable to make 
adequate provision for his spouse's retirement years should he pre-
decease her; and it provided the joint and survivor rules to correct this 
situation." Apart from such hardships, a failure to provide a pre-
retirement survivor annuity is inconsistent with the premise that pen-
sion contributions previously made on behalf of an employee were 
made in lieu of additional compensation or some other benefit he 
would have received." 
Representative Elizabeth Holtzman (D-N.Y.) pointed out in the 
floor debate in the House on H.R. 2, the predecessor there to ERISA, 
that while many of her colleagues had the impression that under H.R. 2 
once a worker's benefits were vested his wife would be provided for 
in the event that he predeceased her, in actuality the bill permitted 
pension plans to prevent a widow from receiving survivor's benefits 
unless her husband died after he had reached his (early) retirement 
age." She argued that this was 
years (from age 35 to age 65), and $500 a year for 30 years would of 
course yield $15,000, but since interest will be paid upon the fund the annual 
contribution could be reduced to perhaps $300. If it is assumed that some 
employees will die before retirement and not receive any retirement benefits 
(no joint and survivor option being available), the trustee will never have 
to purchase annuities for such employees. The employer, therefore, may pay 
less than the $300 above since annuities for all participants need not be 
purchased—the exact sum to be deducted may be actuarially determined in 
advance by 'discounting for mortality.' Similarly, many employees will 
terminate employment before retirement and accordingly may not receive 
any or only reduced benefits. An allowance may similarly be computed for 
this factor which is called 'discounting for severance.' Thus, the employer 
under this example might ultimately have to contribute $200 per year on 
behalf of each 35-year old participant after interest, mortality, and severance 
assumptions have been taken into account." 
9 See 120 Cong. Rec. H1285 (daily ed., Feb. 28, 1974) (Rep. Erlenborn). 
10 H.R. Rep. No. 93-807, at 67. 
11 See S. Rep. No. 93-383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1973) (reproduced in 
Appendix C) (hereinafter cited as S. Rep. No. 93-383); H.R. Rep. No. 93-807, 
at 53. See generally Hunter v. Sparling, 87 Cal. App. 2d 711, 722, 197 P.2d 807, 
814 (1948); Note, "Forfeiture of Pension Benefits for Violation of Covenants 
Not to Compete," 61 Nw. L. Rev. 290, 292 (1966); Note, "Pension Plans and 
the Rights of the Retired Worker," 70 Colum. L. Rev. 909, 917 (1970). 
12 The text of this provision of H.R. 2 as passed by the House of Repre-
sentatives, and of its accompanying committee report, is contained in Appendix B. 
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a serious gap in the pending bill. It allows for a 20 to 25 year period 
after full vesting of an employee's benefits during which his wife is 
left unprotected in the event of his death. This is [unconscionable], 
particularly because it is not apparent from the language of either the 
bill or the report which is supposed to explain the bill. I am afraid 
that it will be misleading to employees who will be lulled into a false 
sense of security in the belief that once their pension rights are vested, 
their wife will be secure regardless of what happens to them. 
If pension plans are to be more than a gamble on survival and a 
bet on coverage, and if we sincerely want to protect the rights of the 
surviving spouse, then my amendment [a plan must provide a qualified 
joint and survivor annuity as to a participant at "the earliest age at 
which he acquired any nonforfeitable rights"] should be adopted. 13  
Representative John N. Erlenborn (R-Ill. ) did not recall that such 
an amendment was discussed in committee, but in any event he doubted 
it: 
because what this does, it converts the pension system into an insurance 
system that would be double, triple, quadruple the costs of operating 
a private pension plan. . . . If a company wants to offer an insurance 
option, that is fine, which many do; they know what the cost is. 
Usually if they do that, there is a combination with a contribution by 
the company and by the employee. This amendment would be so 
terribly expensive that it would completely destroy, in my opinion, the 
private pension systems." 
Representative John H. Dent (D-Pa.) opposed the amendment 
as well on the basis that the discussion in committee had revolved around 
setting some kind of assurance that there would be a payment of sur-
vival benefits. 
We established a base which set a date for survival before being made 
available at the earliest retirement age. Anything but that would give 
such an enormous cost that we could in many cases completely destroy 
the pension fund, because if one is to be given survivor benefits at 
any part of his vesting period, which is what the amendment does, 
13 120 Cong. Rec. H1285 (daily ed., Feb. 28, 1974) (Rep. Holtzman). 
14 Id. (Rep. Erlenborn). Representative Erlenborn was the senior minority 
member on the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on 
Education and Labor, which conducted the hearings in the Ninety-Third Congress 
on H.R. 2 and H.R. 462, bills to revise the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure 
Act, and it was, in effect, responsible for shepherding through the House the 
House labor component of ERISA. Indeed, the final bill H.R. 2 was apparently 
so labeled in deference to the fact that the original House labor bill, H.R. 2, 
originated in the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on 
Education and Labor. 
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there is no way that one can accumulate funds in a retirement pension 
fund without having a definite number of years to be completed. So, 
when we compute the survivor benefits at the earliest retirement age, 
we know the [actuaries] have something to work with. 15 
Representative Al Ullman (D-Ore.) also acknowledged the bal-
ancing approach the responsible committees had taken: 
If we impose this kind of requirement, all we are going to do is put 
a lot of private pension programs out of business. . . . What we have 
tried to do is establish a balance, bring up the minimum pension re-
quirements to the full extent possible without jeopardizing the existence 
of the private pension program and without discouraging the establish-
ment of additional pension programs. If we impose the kind of high 
costs involved in this amendment of the private pension system, we 
will only discourage the development of further private pension pro-
grams and put a lot of existing ones out of business. Mr. Chairman, I 
commend the gentlewoman for her purpose, but this amendment can-
not be accepted on this bill, in my judgement, (sic) without doing great 
disturbance to the Act. 16 
In short, the concept that a pension benefit is accrued or earned 
in lieu of additional compensation to a participant, and, hence, it 
should be his and fully vested as earned, was outweighed by the addi-
tional costs that would be imposed upon plans by providing such "vest-
ing"; and the exceptions to the joint and survivor annuity, that in 
effect swallow the general rule, should be viewed as a concession to 
the balancing approach between meaningful reform and keeping the 
costs within reasonable limits. 17 A provision more in line than that of 
Representative Holtzman with the deferred vesting approach of ERISA, 
15 Id. at H1286 (Rep. Dent). Representative Dent was the Chairman of the 
General Subcommittee on Labor, and was one of the prime movers in the pension 
reform movement that culminated in ERISA. For an excellent discussion of the 
legislative history of ERISA and prior federal regulation of employee benefit 
plans, see Chadwick & Foster, "Federal Regulation of Retirement Plans: The 
Quest for Parity," 28 Vand. L. Rev. 642, 668-671 (1975). 
16  120 Cong. Rec. H1286 (daily ed., Feb. 28, 1974) (Rep. Ullman). Mr. 
Ullman was Mr. Dent's counterpart on the House Ways and Means Committee; 
he introduced H.R. 12481, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 1974) (later revised as 
H.R. 12855). The Committee Report to H.R. 12855, H.R. Rep. No. 93-807, is 
an extremely important component of the legislative history of ERISA in general 
and of joint and survivor annuity provisions of I.R.C. § 401(a)(11). 
17 Compare S. Rep. No. 93-383, at 18. See also Hearings on H.R. 2 and 
H.R. 462 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on 
Education and Labor, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 235, 330, 441, 509 (1973); Hearings 
on S. 4, S. 1179, and S. 1631 before the Subcomm. on Private Pension Plans of 
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (Pt. 1) 346-341, 354 (1973). 
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which in itself constitutes a compromise with increased costs," would 
have been to have required in a defined benefit plan a survivor benefit 
equal to the present value of the vested accrued benefit." Such a rule 
would not have added an insurance feature to the plan, but only 
precluded an actuarial assumption that discounted for preretirement 
mortality.' Under this approach, the surviving spouse would be en-
titled to precisely the benefit that the participant would have been 
entitled had he terminated employment rather than died. 
General Rules 
Introduction and Overview 
The Senate Retirement Income Security for Employees bill (H.R. 
4200 as passed by the Senate) simply provided that a qualified plan 
that provided for the payment of retirement benefits in the form of 
an annuity for the life of a participant, had to provide for such pay-
ment in the form of a joint and survivor annuity: that is, an annuity 
for the life of the participant (and of his spouse) after he retired, fol-
lowed by a survivor annuity for the life of his surviving spouse after 
his postretirement death, unless the participant elected within two 
years of his normal retirement age or, if earlier, within two years of 
the annuity starting date, not to have the benefit paid in such form." 
Such election could be made only if the participant received a written 
explanation of the terms and conditions of such joint and survivor 
annuity and the effect of the election. The postretirement survivor 
annuity could not be less than one-half the amount of the annuity 
payable to the participant during the joint lives of the participant and 
his spouse. It is important to note that the Senate provision required 
only a postretirement survivor annuity. In other words, the joint and 
survivor annuity requirement was triggered only when payment of 
retirement benefits had commenced, and no survivor annuity was 
required if the participant died prior to retiring. 
The House bill ( H.R. 2) differed from the Senate bill in two 
major respects: (1) A mandatory preretirement survivor annuity had to 
18 See H.R. Rep. No. 93-807, at 19. 
18 The reserve is the actuarially determined amount required to provide the 
accrued benefit based upon the age and compensation of the participant at the 
time of the determination. 
20 For discussion of the concept of discounting for preretirement and mor-
tality, see note 8 supra. 
21 H.R. 4200, as passed by the Senate, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 261(a) (2) 
(1973) (reproduced in App. C). 
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be provided where the participant died after reaching his earliest 
retirement age under the plan, but before he retired (unless he elected 
not to have such a benefit) ; and (2) two antiadverse selection ele-
ments were added. 22 First, payment of a postretirement and a pre-
retirement survivor annuity was mandated (where the plan provided 
for the payment of benefits in the form of annuity) only if the par-
ticipant and his spouse had been married throughout the five-year 
period ending on the annuity starting date in the former case, or 
ending on the date of the participant's death in the latter case. Second, 
an election-out from the joint and survivor annuity (as to both the 
preretirement and postretirement survivor annuity) was provided, as 
in the Senate bill, but a plan could require that no such election would 
become effective if the participant died during a period (not in excess 
of two years) beginning on the date of election or revocation of an 
election. 
The qualified joint and survivor annuity definition was the same 
for the preretirement and postretirement survivor annuity, namely, 
an annuity for the life of the participant, with a survivor annuity for 
the life of the spouse, that was not contingent upon survivorship of 
such spouse beyond the earliest retirement age of the participant and 
that was not less than one-half the amount of the annuity payable 
during the joint lives of the participant and his spouse. However, a 
preretirement survivor annuity is not a joint and survivor annuity. The 
participant never receives a joint lives annuity during his and his 
surviving spouse's joint lives because he died prior to retirement; had 
he retired and then died, the benefit would be a joint lives annuity 
followed by a surviving spouse annuity unless he elected out. Instead, 
there is simply a survivor annuity. 
The Conference Committee modeled the joint and survivor an-
nuity provisions of ERISA more on the House bill than on the Senate 
bill. The major substantive changes were that the preretirement sur-
vivor annuity was changed from a mandatory provision with an election-
out by the participant to an election-in, under which the participant 
had to be given a reasonable period before his earliest retirement age 
to elect to have a preretirement survivor annuity payable as to the period 
beginning on his earliest retirement age and ending on the date of his 
normal retirement age if he continued employment during that period." 
A different definition of the amount of the preretirement survivor an-
nuity was also provided. 24 The postretirement survivor annuity, in 
22 H.R. 2, as passed by the House, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1021(a) (1) (1974) 
(reproduced in App. B). 
28 I.R.C. § 401(a) (11) (C); ERISA § 205(c) (1). 
24 I.R.C. § 401(a) (11 ) (C) ; ERISA § 205(c) (2). 
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addition to the floor of 50 percent of the joint lives annuity, now had 
a ceiling imposed. It could not be greater than the amount of the 
annuity payable during the joint lives of the participant and his spouse. 25 
 The five-year marriage rule was shortened to a one-year period" and 
made optional with the plan; and the two-year period for giving affect 
to an election or revocation of an election was elaborated further. 27 
 In summary, the major substantive difference between ERISA and 
the House bill lies in the preretirement survivor annuity. The House 
bill in essence did not distinguish between pre- and postretirement an-
nuities; the statute as enacted distinguished between them, both as to 
who has the burden to choose the preretirement survivor annuity pro-
vision and the amount of the annuity. 
Unfortunately, the progression from the relatively straightforward 
Senate provision of a mandatory postretirement joint and survivor an-
nuity where the plan provided for the payment of benefits in the form 
of a life annuity to the extremely complicated and, as will be discussed, 
in places technically deficient final joint and survivor annuity provi-
sion, resulted in an unwieldy provision that most defined contribution 
plans will avoid by eliminating any life annuity option. 
Postretirement Joint and Survivor Annuity 
A "qualified joint and survivor annuity" is an annuity for the life 
of the participant after his retirement, with a survivor annuity after 
his death for the life of his spouse that is not less than one-half of, nor 
greater than, the amount of the annuity payable during the joint lives 
of the participant and his spouse, and that is the actuarial equivalent 
of a single life annuity for the life of the participant." 
The requirement that the postretirement survivor annuity not 
be greater than the amount of the annuity payable during the joint 
lives of the participant and his spouse (which will be referred to as the 
100 percent joint lives ceiling) was not contained in the House bill 
but was added in Conference. On the surface, it seems that the drafters 
of Code Section 401(a) (11) imposed this limitation in Conference 
in order to backstop the application of new Section 415 to defined 
benefit plans. In essence, that section provides that no qualified benefit 
plan may provide for an annual benefit as to a participant that exceeds 
the lesser of $75,000 a year (adjusted under an escalator clause) or 100 
25 I.R.C. § 401 (a) ( 1 1 )(G) (iii); ERISA § 205(g) (3). 
26 I.R.C. § 401 (a) (1 1 )(D); ERISA § 205(d). 
27 I.R.C. § 401 (a) ( 1 1 )(F); ERISA § 205(f). 
28 I.R.C. § 401 (a) ( 1 1 )(G)(iii); ERISA § 205(g) (3); Prop. Reg. § 1.401 
(a)-1 1 (b)(1 ). 
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percent of the participant's average compensation for his high three 
years."" The term "annual benefit" in turn is defined as excluding 
"that portion of any joint and survivor annuity which constitutes a 
qualified joint and survivor annuity. . . ." 30 Obviously, if a defined 
benefit survivor annuity could exceed the joint lives annuity, the plan 
could avoid the Section 415 limitations through providing a very rich 
survivor annuity. The Conference Report acknowledges a tie-in be-
tween the 100 percent joint lives ceiling under the joint and survivor 
annuity and Section 415, in its discussion of the latter provision: "If a 
benefit were paid in the form of a joint and survivor annuity for the 
benefit of the participant and his spouse, the value of this feature would 
not be taken into account unless the survivor benefit were greater than 
the joint benefit." 31 The failure of Code Section 401(a) (11) (G) (3) 
in its definition of "qualified joint and survivor annuity" to distinguish 
between a defined benefit plan and a defined contribution plan, as the 
Section 415 limitation does, was to have serious effects upon defined 
23 I.R.C. §§ 415(a)(1)(A) and 415(b)(1). 
30I.R.C. § 415(b)(2)(B). The reference in § 415(b)(2)(B) to § 401(a) 
(11) (H) (iii) should read "section 401 (a) (11) (G) (iii)." 
31 H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 344 (1974) (reproduced in 
App. A) (hereinafter referred to and cited as H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280). 
It happens that the provision that the survivor annuity cannot be greater 
than the amount of the annuity that is payable to the participant during the joint 
lives of the participant and his spouse, closely parallels the longstanding Treasury 
requirement that benefits payable to a beneficiary of an employee must be inci-
dental to the primary purpose of distributing the accumulated funds to the em-
ployee. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (1). The thrust of this requirement, according to the 
Service, was that the present value of the payments to be made to the participant 
generally must be more than 50 percent of the present value of the total payments 
to be made to the participant and his beneficiaries. See Rev. Rul. 72-241, 1972-I 
C.B. 108. However, an exception was carved out to permit distribution of a 
participant's interest over a period equal to his life and thereafter the life of his 
spouse, even though the participant's beneficiary was someone other than his 
spouse. Id. 
The "incidental benefits" concept continues to have vitality under ERISA. 
New I.R.C. § 401(a) (14) mandates that a qualified trust provide that, unless a 
participant otherwise elects, the payment of benefits under the plan to such par-
ticipant will begin not later than the sixtieth day after the latest of the close of 
the plan year in which occurs the date on which the participant attains the earlier 
of age sixty-five or plan normal retirement age, the tenth anniversary of the 
year in which the participant commenced participation in the plan, or the date 
on which the participant terminated service with the employer. The proposed 
Treasury regulations under this provision provide for an election by a participant 
to receive payment of benefits at a date later than that provided above if the 
benefits payable under the plan with respect to the participant in the event of his 
death would be more than "incidental" within the meaning of Reg. § 1.401-1(b) 
(1)(i). See Prop. Reg. § 1.401(a)-14(b)(3). 
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contribution plans under the proposed Treasury regulations. It is 
possible, however, that the draftsmen imposed the joint lives ceiling 
in Code Section 401 (a) (11) for another reason, applicable to both 
defined benefit and defined contribution plans. Without such a ceiling, 
it would have been possible, for example, to provide that the standard 
benefit was a joint lives annuity with a survivor annuity of five times 
the joint lives annuity. In such circumstances, due to the severe re-
duction in the joint lives annuity, most, if not all, participants would 
elect instead a straight life annuity. A joint lives ceiling on the post-
retirement survivor annuity precludes such bias in favor of an election-
out. 
The "actuarial equivalent" of a single life annuity for the life of 
the participant requirement means that the joint and survivor annuities 
together must be "at least the actuarial equivalent of the normal form 
of benefit offered under the plan." " 
Requirement of Postretirement Survivor Annuity 
Whether a qualified retirement plan must provide a postretirement 
survivor annuity turns on whether the participant may receive life 
annuity retirement payments and whether it can be said that such life 
annuity payments are provided by the plan. Once it is determined that 
a plan is required to provide the standard benefit in the form of a 
qualified joint and survivor annuity, the further question arises as to 
which plan benefits it must provide in such form. 
Provision of "Life" Annuity by Plan 
According to the proposed regulations, where a plan provides 
for the payment of benefits in any form of a life annuity, that is, "an 
annuity requiring survival of the participant or his spouse as a condi-
tion for payment," 33 its trust will not be qualified after the effective 
date of ERISA by virtue of the joint and survivor annuity provisions 
if the plan fails to provide for the payment of annuity benefits in a 
form having the effect of a qualified joint and survivor annuity." The 
"life annuity" requirement of the proposed Treasury regulations is 
derived from House Committee Report Number 93-807. 35 With this 
rule, the proposed Treasury regulations laid to rest the fear, based upon 
32 Prop. Reg. § 1.401(a)-11(b)(1). 
33 Prop. Reg. § 1.401(a)-11(a)(1). 
34 I.R.C. § 401(a) (11) (A); compare ERISA § 205(a). 
35  Preamble to Proposed Treasury Regulations on Qualified Joint and Sur-
vivor Annuities, 40 Fed. Reg. 45828 (Oct. 3, 1975). See H.R. Rep. No. 93-807, 
at 67. 
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the definition of amounts received as an annuity under Code Section 
72,3° that the term "benefits in the form of an annuity" as used in Code 
Section 401(a) (11) encompassed determinable benefits payable at 
regular intervals over a period of more than one full year from the 
date on which they begin. Unfortunately, the proposed regulations 
perhaps less clearly define when a plan must provide for the payment 
of annuity benefits in the form having the effect of a qualified joint 
and survivor annuity. 
It may be noted that the Senate bill expressly provided that the joint 
and survivor annuity requirement was triggered only where the plan 
provided "for the payment of benefits in the form of an annuity for 
the life of a participant." 37 Accordingly, following traditional statu-
tory construction, the subsequent House and Conference provisions, 
which mandated a joint and survivor annuity only where "the plan 
. . . provides for the payment of benefits in the form of an annuity," 38 
used a broader term than the Senate provision, which was not limited 
to life benefits. 39 Consequently, the "life annuity" approach of the 
regulations (necessary for sound plan administration) may expose a 
multitude of plans that seek to avoid the complexities of the joint and 
survivor annuity provisions through eliminating life annuity options, 
to litigation by surviving spouses demanding a survivor annuity. 
Many defined contribution plans nevertheless may be expected 
to follow the road map contained in the Treasury regulations and dis-
continue life annuity payment options. Some question has been 
raised, however, whether this alternative is available to a money-
purchase pension plan or a target benefit pension plan, both of which 
are defined contribution plans, but display some pension plan aspects. 
Pre-ERISA Treasury Regulations Section 1.401-1(B) (1) (i) defines 
the term "pension plan" as a plan established or maintained by an em-
ployer to provide for the payment of definitely determinable bene-
fits "over a period of years, usually for life, after retirement." It is the 
writer's understanding that the current Internal Revenue Service posi-
tion is that a defined contribution "pension" plan (i.e., a money-purchase 
38 "[T]he provisions of section 72 distinguish between 'amounts received as 
an annuity' and 'amounts not received as an annuity.' In general, 'amounts re-
ceived as an annuity' are amounts which are payable at regular intervals over a 
period of more than one full year from the date on which they are deemed to 
begin, provided the total of the amounts so payable or the period for which they 
are to be paid can be determined as of that date." Reg. § 1.72-I(b). 
37 H.R. 4200, as passed by the Senate, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 261(a)(2) 
(1973). 
38 H.R. 2, as passed by the House, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 102(a) (1) (1974). 
39Note 37 supra. 
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pension plan and, perhaps, a target benefit plan) can meet the require-
ment of providing definitely determinable benefits over a period of years 
by providing a nonlife annuity. Indeed, it should be possible to provide 
an annuity for the life expectancy of the participant or for the joint life 
expectancy of his surviving spouse without its constituting a life annuity. 
In other words, the payments would continue for the life expectancy or 
expectancies at the time of retirement and cease at that point whether 
the participant and his surviving spouse lived longer or shorter than 
their life expectancies. Apparently, the Service expects most defined 
contribution plans will discontinue all life annuity options. Ironically, 
the social goal of providing for a life annuity option in a defined con-
tribution plan and the equally desirable social goal of providing for 
survivor benefits to surviving spouses ultimately have resulted in a 
provision in ERISA that will cause most defined contribution plans, 
at least, to abandon life annuity and joint and survivor annuity options 
for payment of retirement benefits. Undoubtedly, the existing tendency 
to pay out defined contribution plan benefits in the form of a lump-sum 
distribution will be accelerated by the joint and survivor annuity pro-
visions of ERISA. 
Some practitioners have suggested that a retiring participant can 
obtain the joint and survivor annuity or straight life annuity advantages 
or treatment even when he receives a lump-sum distribution by "rolling 
over" such distribution within sixty days after it is received into an 
Individual Retirement Annuity (IRA). 40 While this would obtain the 
income tax deferral aspects of a straight life or a joint and survivor 
annuity option under the plan itself, since such annuity benefits would 
be taxed only when received under Code Section 72, substantial estate 
and gift tax advantages are lost under an IRA approach. Code Section 
2039(c) provides that the value of an annuity or other payment re-
ceived by any beneficiary under an employees' trust or under a retire-
ment annuity contract purchased by an employees' trust forming the 
part of a qualified plan, is excluded from the gross estate of the de-
ceased participant.'" Also, Code Section 2517 provides that the ex-
ercise or nonexercise by an employee of an election or option under 
which an annuity or other payment is payable to any beneficiary at or 
4° The payment of the balance to the credit of an employee from a § 401(a) 
employees' trust is exempt from taxation if such payment constitutes a lump-sum 
distribution (qualifying under I.R.C. § 402(e) (4) (A)) and the employee trans-
fers all the property he received in such distribution to an individual retirement 
account (I.R.C. § 408(a)) or an Individual Retirement Annuity (I.R.C. § 
408(b)) within sixty days after he received the property (I.R.C. § 402(e)(5)). 
41 I.R.C. § 2039(c) expressly does not apply to sole proprietors or partners 
under H.R. 10 plans. 
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after the employee's death, e.g., election of a joint and survivor annuity, 
is not considered a transfer in gift if the election is provided under an 
employees' trust or under a contract purchased by an employees' trust. 
Neither of these provisions refers to IRAs. Accordingly, undesirable 
estate or gift tax consequences would attach to rolling the lump-sum 
distribution into an IRA (with a survivor annuity provision). 
In the past, defined contribution plans frequently, as indicated 
above, provided a participant with the option to choose between sev-
eral forms of benefit payment, commonly including life annuity, term 
certain annuity, and lump-sum distribution alternatives. Against this 
background, some practitioners apparently assumed, for example, that 
a defined contribution plan with a similar provision had to provide under 
ERISA only that in the event the participant elected the life annuity 
option, then that option had to provide for the payment of benefits 
in a form having the effect of a qualified joint and survivor annuity. 42 
 Yet, the entire tenor of the election-in and election-out discussed below 
would indicate that if a qualified plan wished to provide a life an-
nuity retirement option, it must provide for the payment of benefits 
in the form of a joint and survivor annuity as the standard benefit under 
the plan, that participants could elect against and then take some other 
optional form of payment. It would seem, moreover, that the proposed 
regulations do mandate that if a defined contribution plan wishes to 
provide a life annuity option, it must state in effect "that the balance 
of a participant's individual account will be paid to him in a form having 
the effect of a qualified joint and survivor annuity unless a participant 
elects another form of benefit payment. . . ." 43 
Practitioners also have suggested it might be possible in a defined 
contribution plan to avoid the joint and survivor requirements by, for 
example, providing that instead of the participant having the option, 
the plan administrator or perhaps the trustee has the sole discretion to 
choose the form in which benefits will be paid under the plan. While 
42 Under this view, the plan would not have to provide the detailed financial 
impact information to the participant unless he elected the joint and survivor 
annuity benefit instead of some other form of benefit. 
In general, where statements are made in this article as to interpretations by 
practitioners, the statement is based on written or oral questions proposed to the 
author at the ALI-ABA Course of Study: Pension, Profit-Sharing, and Other 
Deferred Compensated Plans held in Los Angeles on Oct. 9-11, 1975 in Washing-
ton, D.C. and on January 22-24, 1976. These questions were either submitted dur-
ing the conferences or posed in subsequent oral or telephone conversations with 
registrants at the conferences. A precis of the written questions on the joint and 
survivor annuities submitted to the author at the above conferences is on file in 
the offices of the Law Journal. 
43 Prop. Reg. § 1.401 (a)-11(a) (2) Illustration. 
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placing such discretion in a party other than the participant historically 
has not disqualified the plan," there is no indication in the statute 
(although the proposed regulations are silent on this point) that the 
joint and survivor annuity provisions can be so easily passed by. Some 
practitioners find support for this technique in Proposed Treasury Regu-
lations Section 1.401 (a)-11 (a) (2), which contains an illustration in 
which the pre-ERISA plan offered a retiring participant options of a 
lump-sum distribution, a life annuity, or five equal cash payments. The 
example concludes that the plan either must discontinue the life an-
nuity option or be "amended to provide that the balance of a par-
ticipant's individual account will be paid to him in a . . . joint and 
survivor annuity. . . ." They would add a third alternative: Take 
the options away from the participant and make them exercisable only 
by the plan administrator. 45 It is submitted that where the life annuity 
is paid by the trust itself, the plan provides a life annuity regardless 
of who exercises the option as to the form of payment. The harder 
question is whether a defined contribution plan can be said to provide 
a life annuity where the participant's account balance is applied to the 
purchase of a life annuity from an insurance company (regardless of 
whether the option for such application lies in the participant, the 
trustee, or the plan administrator). Yet, if the answer is that such a 
plan does not provide a life annuity, defined benefit plans as well could 
easily avoid the requirements of a joint and survivor annuity by pay-
ment of benefits through purchases of annuities (including life an-
nuities). Additionally, such a result could be viewed as a boon to 
the insurance industry. 
The apparent thrust of the joint and survivor annuity provisions 
(as well as the necessity to limit the fiduciary liability of the plan ad-
ministrator or trustee) is that the right to make retirement elections 
should (perhaps must) rest in the participant. However, some prac-
titioners have expressed concern about moving the right to exercise 
the different optional forms of payment under the plan from the com-
mittee or trustee—a common design feature in pre-ERISA plans—to 
the participant on grounds of the doctrine of constructive receipt. 46 
44 See Meldrum & Fewsmith, Inc., 20 T.C. 790 (1953). See generally Lee, 
"(ERISA) Fiduciary Responsibilities and Prohibited Transactions" A-2, B.N.A. 
Tax Mgmt. Portfolio No. 308 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Lee). 
45 Even if this drafting technique were successful, it would expose the plan 
administrator to considerable fiduciary liability. Cf. Geidman v. Anheuser Busch, 
Inc., 299 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1962). 
46 The doctrine of constructive receipt applies where a cash basis taxpayer is 
presently entitled to money that is immediately available to him without substantial 
limitations or restrictions, and where his failure to receive it in cash is entirely due 
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In the first place, the premise that lodging the right to make the election 
in the trustee or committee would avoid constructive receipt is prob-
ably fallacious in that historically such election was almost invariably 
made in accordance with the instructions of the participant himself. 
More significantly, however, Code Section 72(h) states that if an an-
nuity contract provides for the payment of a lump sum in full discharge 
of an obligation under the contract, subject to an option to receive an 
annuity instead, and the annuity option is exercised within sixty days 
after the day on which such lump sum first becomes payable, then 
no part of the lump sum will be considered as includable in the gross 
income of the participant at the time it first became payable. In short, 
Section 72(h) carves out an exception to constructive receipt where 
the taxpayer has a choice between taking an annuity and a lump-sum 
distribution. 
The Internal Revenue Service has applied Code Section 72(h) 
to qualified plans in Revenue Ruling 59-94. 47 There the Service ruled 
under Section 72(h) that where a participant elects within sixty days 
after he separates from the service of the employer to have the trustee 
of an employees' trust purchase for and transfer to him an annuity in 
lieu of a lump-sum distribution of the balance credited to his account, 
no part of such lump-sum distribution would be includable in his gross 
income at the time it first became payable. Possibly the same result 
would obtain where the annuity was provided by the trust itself rather 
than the trustee purchasing a contract. 48 
In this context, clearly an annuity is not limited to a life annuity, 
but instead constitutes a generic term covering amounts that are payable 
at regular intervals over a period of more than one full year from the 
date at which they are deemed to begin, provided that the total of 
amounts so payable or the period for which they are to be paid can 
be determined as of the annuity starting date. Thus, as long as the 
participant has a choice between an annuity and some other form of 
payment or payments, and he chooses the annuity option under a quali-
fied plan, he will not be taxed under the doctrine of constructive receipt 
as if he had exercised, for example, the lump-sum distribution option. 
Where, however, he exercises some option other than either an annuity 
to his own volition: A taxpayer may not deliberately turn his back on income 
and avoid taxation. Reg. § 1.451-2(a); 2 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 
10.01. In the area of taxation of participants or beneficiaries under plans qualified 
under Section 401(a), the question whether the amounts are "made available" 
(see I.R.C. § 402), but the rules and analysis are those of constructive receipt. 
47 1959-1 C.B. 25. 
48 Cf. Rev. Rul. 67-361, 1967-2 C.B. 153. But cf. Private Letter Ruling 
referred to in P-H Pension & Profit-Sharing Rep. 11 10,387 (1976). 
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option or the lump-sum distribution option, it is possible that he would 
be taxed under the doctrine of constructive receipt. 
For instance, under the example set forth in the proposed regu-
lations where the life annuity option is deleted with the remaining op-
tions being a lump-sum cash distribution, an in-kind distribution of em-
ployer securities, and five equal annual cash payments, if the participant 
chose the lump-sum distribution of employer securities as his option, 
it is possible that under the doctrine of constructive receipt he would 
be immediately taxed, although he would not be taxed on the annual 
appreciation in the employer securities until disposed of. Of course, if 
he elected the five equal annual cash payments option, that apparently 
would come within Section 72(h) as an annuity option. 
While many defined contribution plans will wish to eliminate 
life annuity payments to obviate the necessity of making a qualified 
joint and survivor annuity the standard plan benefit, for the administra-
tive reasons discussed below, there may be inadvertent traps that 
escape the reviewer of the plan upon qualification, that in theory would 
disqualify the plan. For example, some defined contribution plans 
contain life insurance. While a life annuity option under such a life 
insurance contract payable at the death of the participant would not 
seem to trigger the joint and survivor annuity requirement of the Code 
since that benefit would not be payable to the participant but to his 
surviving spouse, retirement plan life insurance contracts also frequently 
provide that at maturity, i.e., normal retirement age, the cash surrender 
value of the policy can be paid in several options, including a life annuity 
option. If such a contract is held by a defined contribution plan and if it 
provides that at normal retirement age any insurance contracts may be 
distributed to the participant, then it is possible the joint and survivor 
annuity provisions are triggered as to the portion of the participant's 
account attributable to the cash surrender value, even though the plan 
itself does not provide for a life annuity payment. While this may seem a 
minor problem, one must bear in mind that the penalty imposed upon 
failure to provide for the payment of life annuity benefits in a form 
having the effect of a qualified joint and survivor annuity is disqualifica-
tion of the trust. 
Which Benefits Must Be Made in Life Annuity Form 
In a stock bonus plan or employee stock ownership plan where 
the distribution is made solely in employer securities and traditionally 
in the form of a lump-sum distribution, there is no life annuity benefit 
that would trigger the qualified joint and survivor annuity requirement. 
On the other hand, it is not unusual for certain types of defined contribu- 
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tion plans, such as thrift plans, 49 to provide that part of the contributions 
will be invested either in general investments or in government securities, 
etc. (usually the employee contribution), while the other portion of the 
contribution (usually the employer contribution) will be invested in 
employer securities. Such plans have sometimes provided that the gen-
eral investments may be distributed under a life annuity option while the 
employer securities will be distributed in a lump-sum in-kind distribution. 
The question is whether, when part of the retirement, disability, or death 
benefit may be distributed in the form of a life annuity while another 
part is distributable only in a lump-sum distribution, the qualified joint 
and survivor annuity provisions apply to the entire benefit. If the entire 
retirement benefit does have to be distributed as an annuity, this will 
destroy some of the advantages to the plan inherent in distributions of 
employer securities." Provided that the participant's spouse or bene-
ficiary is entitled to the participant's entire employer security account 
upon his death, there is no policy reason to require that it be paid in the 
form of a survivor annuity. In addition, under the statute, only "annuity 
payments" must be paid in the form of a qualified joint and survivor 
annuity . If the only form of distribution of the employer security account 
is in a lump-sum distribution, then it is not a life annuity benefit and the 
qualified joint and survivor annuity provisions do not apply. Finally, 
the proposed regulations apparently apply the joint and survivor annuity 
49 A thrift plan is a pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan to which 
an employee savings feature (i.e., mandatory employee contributions) is added. 
Thrift plans usually start with employee contributions and then the employer's 
contribution is related to the amount or rate of employee contributions. Most 
thrift plans permit the employee to choose the amount of his savings within a 
specified range, and often the allowable amount of such employee contributions 
is expressed in terms of a percentage of pay, such as 2, 4, or 6 percent of base 
pay. See Lee, Slabaugh & Fogg at 79. The IRS tests for "discrimination" where 
plans require contributions of more than 6 percent of pay from employees. In 
so testing, integration, discussed in note 58 infra, is taken into account. Pub. 
778, Pt. 4(g) (Feb. 1972). 
50  The receipt of employer securities by a participant in a lump-sum distribu-
tion, as defined in I.R.C. § 402(e) (4) (A)—provided that the employee has par-
ticipated in the plan for five years and elects a lump-sum distribution (I.R.C. 
§§ 402(e) (4)(H) and 402(e) (4) (B)—is income tax free to the extent that the 
stock or securities were acquired with the employee's own contribution and, more 
significantly, all unrealized appreciation of the employer stock is income tax free 
upon distribution (l.R.C. §§ 402(e)(4)(D)(ii) and 402(e)(4)(j).) Such un-
realized appreciation is taxed upon a later sale, but is treated as a long-term 
capital gain regardless of how long the stock is held by the employee. (Reg. § 
1,402(a)-1(b) (1) and (2).) See Rev. Rul. 75-125, I975-1 C.B. 254. The bal-
ance of the fair market value of the stock distributed is taxed as any other lump-
sum distribution is taxed. 
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requirements only to those benefits that are paid in the form of a life 
annuity. 51 
A closely related question is whether the postretirement joint and 
survivor annuity provisions apply where a plan provides that if a par-
ticipant's defined contribution account balance does not exceed a certain 
minimum amount (for example, $1,750), payment of the benefits must 
be made in a lump-sum distribution rather than under a qualified joint 
survivor life annuity (with an election-out as to other options). It is 
arguable that such a plan does not provide for the payment of a benefit 
in the form of a life annuity, where the benefit is less than a stated 
account balance floor. Providing such an exception in the regulations at 
least as to defined contribution plans would seem advisable. 
A similar question is whether a disability (retirement) benefit must 
be paid in the form of a joint and survivor annuity where the normal 
retirement benefit is paid in the form of a life annuity, but, upon dis-
ability, a participant's account balance is paid in a lump-sum distribution. 
The principal argument that the lump-sum death benefit would not have 
to be paid in the form of a qualified joint and survivor annuity, would 
be that the joint and survivor annuity requirement is triggered only as to 
benefits which the plan provides in the form of annuity benefits, and the 
lump-sum death benefit would not constitute an annuity benefit. This 
argument is supported by Proposed Treasury Regulations Section 1.401 
(a)-11 (a) (1), which provides that a plan "providing for the payment 
of benefits in any form of a life annuity . . . [must provide] that these 
benefits must be paid in a form having the effect of a qualified joint and 
survivor annuity." In other words, the joint and survivor annuity re-
quirement is triggered only where the benefit is paid in any form of a life 
annuity, which a lump-sum disability distribution would not constitute. 
It is clear, however, that where a disability benefit is paid in the form of 
a life annuity, the joint and survivor annuity, i.e., the postretirement 
survivor annuity requirement, commences as soon as the participant 
reaches or would have reached the "earliest retirement age" under the 
plan. 
Code Section 401(a) (11) (B) states that notwithstanding the re-
quirement that a plan provide for the payment of benefits in annuity 
51 Prop. Reg. § 1.401 (a)-11(a) (1) provides that a "trust, which is a part 
of a plan providing for the payment of benefits in any form of a life annuity. . . , 
shall not constitute a qualified trust .. . unless such a plan provides that these 
benefits must be paid in a form having the effect of a qualified joint and survivor 
annuity. Therefore, any benefits which may be paid in any form of a life annuity 
must be paid in a form having the effect of a qualified joint and survivor annuity 
unless the participant makes the election ... not to receive benefits in this form." 
(Emphasis added.) 
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payments in a joint and survivor annuity form, if a plan provides for 
payment of benefits before "normal retirement age," it is not required to 
pay them in the form of a joint and survivor annuity "during the period 
beginning on the date on which the employee enters into the plan .. . 
and ending on the later of (i) the date the employee reaches the earliest 
retirement age under the plan, or (ii) the first day of the 120th month 
beginning before the date on which the employee reaches normal retire-
ment age." Yet, one early commentator argued that the joint and sur-
vivor annuity provisions did "not mandate payment in a joint and 
survivor option form upon the retirement before normal retirement age 
of an employee who has previously failed to make an election of that 
form of payment." 52  Thus, it was contended that an early retirement 
benefit did not have to be in the form of a joint and survivor annuity." 
Yet, clearly, a plan must provide for payment of annuity benefits in a 
form having the effect of a joint and survivor annuity at times other than 
normal retirement age (with an election-out) where it provides annuity 
benefits at such other ages or upon the occurrence of other stated events. 
The statutory definition of annuity starting date, repeated in the proposed 
regulations ("the first day of the first period for which an amount is 
received as an annuity [whether by reason of retirement or by reason of 
disability]")," forces the conclusion that a joint and survivor annuity 
must be provided in the event of disability retirement (but only from the 
later of the date early retirement benefits would be available or the 
beginning of the period commencing ten years before normal retirement 
age) 55 if such retirement benefit is paid optionally in the form of a life 
annuity. 
On its face, an early retirement life annuity benefit constitutes a 
benefit payable in the form of a life annuity and, therefore, triggers the 
requirement that it be paid in the form of a qualified joint and survivor 
annuity (unless the election-out provisions apply, or the one-year waiting 
period rule, discussed below, should apply). Code Section 401(a) (11) 
(B) only determines the date that the postretirement survivor annuity 
provision becomes operative, or, to put it another way, the period 
"during" which a survivor annuity does not have to be paid if a par- 
52 National Coordinating Committee for Multiemployer Plans, "Recommen-
dations on Spouse Options Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act" 
(March 25, 1975), reprinted in 3 CCH Pension Plan Guide 11 25,003 (1975) 
(memorandum submitted to the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue 
Service) (hereinafter referred to as and cited as "Recommendations on Spouse 
Options"). 
53 Id. 
54 Prop. Reg. § 1.401(a)-11(b) (2). 
55 See Prop. Reg. § 1.40I(a)-1I(d)(2)(iii). 
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ticipant retires and then dies. But after that period ends, a postretire-
ment survivor annuity must be provided upon the death of the par-
ticipant. 
The Conference Committee Report does not distinguish between 
early retirement and normal retirement, and, indeed, at times clearly 
uses the term "retirement" in a generic sense: "In the case of an em-
ployee who retires, or who attains the normal retirement age, the joint 
and survivor provision is to apply unless the employee elected other-
wise." 56 The statute itself also uses the terms "retirement" or "retirement 
benefits" as generic terms, as may be seen in the definition of "earliest 
retirement age" as the earliest date under the plan on which the par-
ticipant "could elect to receive retirement benefits." 57 (There is no clear 
indication whether this term excludes early retirement where company 
consent is required. ) 58 Finally, the most convincing reason that the 
standard form of an early retirement benefit in a plan providing a life 
annuity early retirement benefit must have the effect of a qualified joint 
58 H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, at 279. 
57 I.R.C. § 401(a)(11)(G)(iii); ERISA § 205(g)(2). 
58 For example, a plan might provide that an employee could retire with the 
consent of the company at age fifty-five and without the consent of the company 
at age sixty. Presumably, in this circumstance age fifty-five would be the earliest 
possible date at which the participant could "elect" to receive retirement benefits. 
See note 91 infra and accompanying text. Furthermore, defined contribution plans 
commonly provided that any early retirement was with the consent of the com-
pany. It may be noted that under prior administrative practice where the em-
ployer's consent was required for optional early retirement (the optional early 
retirement age had to be reasonable), the value of the early retirement benefit 
could not exceed the value of the employee's vested benefits at that time. Pub. 
778, P. 5(f) (Feb. 1972). Furthermore, if the optional early retirement age was 
earlier than sixty-five (sixty for women), and if the plan were integrated with 
OASDI or with benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act, the benefits that 
depend upon such integration had to be appropriately limited. Id. 
The concept of integration has been explained as follows: 
"If the benefits available under social security are explicitly recognized, the 
benefit structure of the pension plan will be set up in such a manner as to 
offset, at least partially (a) the exclusion of earnings above the taxable wage 
base [as to which OASDI or Federal Insurance Contribution Act taxes are 
imposed, in 1975, $14,100], (b) the heavier weighting assigned under the 
social security formula to the lower segments of the worker's average monthly 
earnings, or (c) both. The general objective will be to provide combined 
benefits, those payable under social security and the plan, that will constitute 
approximately the same percentage of the employee's compensation, irre-
spective of his position on the pay scale. In other words, the combined 
benefits of the higher paid employees will be about the same percentage of 
their earnings as that applicable to the lower paid employees. This approach 
to plan design not only serves the plan sponsor's concept of equitable treat- 
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and survivor annuity is the congressional rationale for providing the 
election-in, discussed below, during the period between early retirement 
age and normal retirement age: If an employee could provide a survivor 
annuity to his spouse only if he had already retired, this would provide 
an unwarranted artificial incentive to exercise early retirement rights 
where available.59  Clearly, the premise here was that joint and survivor 
annuity benefits would automatically be available upon early retirement. 
It was to prevent an artificial incentive to elect early retirement that a 
participant was permitted at early retirement age, where he had not in 
fact retired, to elect into a joint and survivor annuity."' 
Notwithstanding that the statute and the proposed Treasury regula-
tions clearly appear to require a joint and postretirement survivor annuity 
as the standard form of early retirement benefit where the plan provides 
an early retirement benefit, this may require a plan to subsidize in some 
instances the surviving spouse option or perhaps inequitably charge all 
participants with certain costs."' Where an employee, who does not take 
early retirement, elects into the preretirement survivor annuity at earliest 
retirement age without retiring, there are additional costs from, in effect, 
the insurance protection provided during the period between earliest 
retirement age and normal retirement age to the surviving spouse. In 
theory, the plan sponsor could take care of this cost, as discussed below, 
where participants elect-in by charging the participants directly each 
year that they have the protection. Clearly, the plan can do so by reduc-
ing the benefits of all participants who elect-in and survive until normal 
retirement age. It has been suggested that under those circumstances an 
employee might refrain from electing into the preretirement survivor 
annuity in order to avoid such costs, but nevertheless count on having 
its protection through being able to retire prior to death, that is, a "death 
bed" election to retire early. This would represent an acute form of 
adverse election, which would not be subject to the two-year waiting rule 
discussed below. Furthermore, there is no requirement of an informed 
choice as to the election for early retirement as there would be to an 
election-out or an election-in. 62  
ment of participants at all income levels but operates to reduce the cost of 
the plan, offsetting to some extent the social security taxes paid by the em-
ployer in respect of the participants. When a plan's benefit formula is set 
up to achieve these objectives, the plan is said to be integrated with social 
security." 
McGill, Fundamentals of Private Pensions I66- 167 (3d ed. 1975). 
59 H.R. Rep. No. 93-807, at 67. 
60 Id. 
61 See "Recommendations on Spouse Options" at 27,036. 
62 
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Election-Out From Postretirement Survivor Annuity 
To meet ERISA, a plan providing a life annuity must give each 
participant a reasonable period before the annuity starting date during 
which he may, in writing, elect-out of the joint and postretirement 
survivor annuity provision. He must be supplied with a written explana-
tion of the joint and survivor provision, "explained in layman's language, 
as well as the practical (dollars and cents) effect on him (and his or her 
spouse)" of making such election-out." Congress believed that regula-
tions should take cognizance of the practical difficulties that certain 
industries might have in contacting all of their participants—particularly 
those having multiemployer plans." The term "annuity starting date" is 
defined as the first day of the first period for which an amount is received 
as an annuity, whether by reason of retirement or by reason of dis-
ability. 65 
The proposed regulations provide that the "reasonable period" for 
election-out generally must include at least the ninety days before the 
annuity starting date." But if the requisite written explanation is not 
provided within the applicable period, the election-out period must be 
extended at least ninety days following the date it is given."' A plan has 
the option of providing that if a participant notifies the plan adminis-
trator less than ninety days prior to the annuity starting date of his intent 
to terminate employment, the election-out period will end on the later of 
the annuity starting date or the fourteenth day following such notice." 
This provision would cover the situation in which a plan permits an 
employee desiring to take early retirement to do so by notifying the plan 
administrator" within one day of his proposed early retirement date of 
his intent to retire. In such circumstances, the commencement of pay- 
63 H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, at 280-281. 
64 Id. 
65 I.R.C. § 401(a) (11) (G) (i); ERISA § 205(g) (1) . See also Prop. Reg. § 
1.401(a)-11(b)(2). 
66 Prop. Reg. § 1.401(a)-11(c)(2)(i). 
67 Id. 
68 Prop. Reg. § 401 (a)-11 (c) (2) (ii). 
69 The term "plan administrator" is defined as (l) the person specifically so 
designated in the plan; (2) if there is no such designation, the employer in the 
case of a single-employer plan and the joint board of trustees or other similar 
group of representatives where a plan is maintained by two or more employers 
and one or more employee organizations (i.e., a Taft-Hartley § 301 plan); or 
(3) if neither of the above apply, such other person as the Secretary of the 
Treasury prescribes. I.R.C. § 414(g); see also ERISA § 3(16) (definition of 
"administrator"). The proposed Treasury regulations provide that where a plan 
administrator is not specifically designated, and is not the employer or in a group 
representing the parties, the plan administrator is the person actually responsible 
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ment of the early retirement benefit frequently would be less than ninety 
days after the participant's notice to take early retirement. This rule in 
such circumstances would permit the election-out period to be shortened 
to two weeks. 
The ninety-day period for an election-out postretirement survivor 
annuity does not mesh very well in a defined contribution plan with the 
statutory requirement that, unless the participant otherwise elects, the 
payment of the benefits under the plan to the participant will begin no 
later than the sixtieth day after (in this context) the date on which the 
participant attains the earlier of age sixty-five or normal retirement age 
under the plan." In many defined contribution plans, the amount of the 
participant's account balance cannot be determined for some time follow-
ing the end of the plan year as of which the trust fund is valued, since 
the computations of allocations to the participant's accounts of trust 
income or loss are based upon this valuation. An accounting may be 
delayed still further until the employer contribution for the plan year has 
been made.' Frequently, the final results under these calculations are 
not available until, at the earliest, sixty to ninety days after the end of the 
plan year." In such circumstances, other proposed Treasury regulations 
would permit payments to begin within sixty days after allocations to 
the participants' accounts have been calculated, retroactive to the sixtieth 
day after the close of the plan year. In that event, the payments would 
need to begin within sixty days after such allocations, but it would not be 
possible ninety days prior to the beginning of the payments to give the 
participant the requisite information as to his account balance and the 
monthly annuities it would provide. It is this sort of administrative 
difficulty that will undoubtedly lead most defined contribution plan 
designers to delete any life annuity option under the plan. It may be 
noted that while the proposed regulations set forth the ninety-day rule 
and the seven-day rules discussed below, the temporary regulations state 
only that the participant will be given a reasonable time in which to 
make the election. 
Within seven days after the first day of the election period, the plan 
administrator must furnish a written notification in nontechnical terms 
for the control, disposition, or management of the cash or property received by 
or contributed to the plan, irrespective of whether such control, disposition, or 
management is exercised directly by such person or persons or indirectly through 
an agent or trustee designated by such person or persons." Prop. Reg. § 1.414 
(g)-1(b)(4). 
70 I.R.C. § 401(a) (14); ERISA § 206(a). 
71 By virtue of I.R.C. § 404(a) (7), a contribution can be delayed until the 
time for filing tax returns for the preceding taxable year (including extensions) 
and be deemed to have been made on the last day of such year. 
72 Prop. Reg. § 1.401(a)-14. 
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to the participant of the availability of the election-out, of the terms and 
conditions of the joint and survivor annuity, and of the availability of 
information as to its financial effect." Upon subsequent written request, 
the administrator must furnish, again within seven days, a statement as 
to the financial effect of the election-out in terms of its effect upon the 
dollar amount of annuity payments." This two-step written explanation 
may help reduce the possibly excessive administrative costs of such ex-
planation, but it seems to circumvent the intent of the statute by placing 
the burden upon the participant of seeking an explanation of the financial 
impact of an election. The Conference Committee Report arguably 
assumes a mandatory explanation of the dollars and cents effect.'" 
An election must be revocable during the election period, and, 
after a revocation, new elections may be made during such period.'" 
Such multiple elections constitute the logical concomitant of the stat-
utorily recognized right to revoke an election." 
Where No Election-Out Is Required 
Proposed Treasury Regulations Section 1.401 (a)-11 (c) (1) states 
that "if a plan provides that a qualified joint and survivor annuity is the 
only form of benefit payable under the plan, no election need be pro-
vided." It had been argued that a mandatory right to elect out of a joint 
and postretirement survivor annuity, where a joint and survivor annuity 
is the normal form, would lead to further burdens on a plan that met the 
objective of protecting the surviving spouse through subsidization of the 
survivor annuity. Were such election-out permitted, the plan would be 
forced to pay a higher single life annuity to a married participant who 
chose not to protect his or her spouse, or the plan would incur adminis-
trative expense in offering participants a meaningless opportunity to 
73 Prop. Reg. § 1.401 (a)-I1 (c) (3) (i). 
74 Prop. Reg. § 1.401 (a)-I1 (c) (3) (ii). 
75 "The employee is to be supplied with a written explanation of the joint 
and survivor provision, explained in layman's language, as well as the practical 
(dollars and cents) effect on him (and his or her spouse) of making an election 
either to take or not to take the provision. At the same time, regulations in this 
area should take cognizance of the practical difficulties which certain industries 
(particularly those having multiemployer plans) may have in contacting all of 
their participants." H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, at 279-80. 
76 Prop. Reg. §§ 1.401(a)-11(c)(4) and 1.401(a)-11(c) (5). 
77 I.R.C. § 401(a)(1I)(F) provides, as discussed below, that a plan will not 
be treated as failing to meet the joint and survivor provisions solely because 
under the plan "there is provision that any election . . . , and any revocation of 
any such election, does not become effective (or ceases to be effective) if the 
participant dies within a period . .. beginning on the date of such election or 
revocation, as the case may be." 
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renounce no-cost protection (i.e., cost borne by the employer) where the 
participant's annuity during the joint life period would not be less than a 
straight annuity." It was argued that Code Section 401 (a) (11) (E) 
and ERISA Section 205(e) do not require that other benefit options be 
made available under a plan that provides a joint and survivor annuity 
as the only form of option, based on the following statement in the Con- 
ference Report: "(Of course, a plan may provide that a joint and survivor 
annuity is to be the only form of benefit payable under the plan, and in 
this case, no election may be provided)." 79 In fact, the quoted statement 
is referring to the election-in preretirement survivor annuity," discussed 
below, and not the election-out postretirement joint and survivor annuity. 
The rationale for the exception in the proposed regulations where 
the qualified joint and survivor annuity is the only form of benefit may be 
that in such cases the employer bears the cost of the survivor annuity 
feature (this assumes that a straight life annuity for a single participant 
and accrued benefit of $10,000 is the actuarial equivalent under the 
plan of the joint lives annuity of the participant the same age at retire- 
ment with a surviving spouse and the same accrued benefit) 81 and, 
78 "Recommendations on Spouse Options" at 27,039. 
79 H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, at 279. 
80 "In the case of an employee who is eligible to retire prior to normal 
retirement age under the plan, and who does not retire, the joint and survivor 
provisions need not be applicable under the plan, unless the employee makes 
an affirmative election. . .. (Of course, the plan may provide that a joint 
and survivor annuity is to be the only form of benefit payable under the 
plan, and in this case, no election need be provided.) 
These rules should help to avoid the situation where an employee who 
is not yet retired might have his own retirement benefit reduced as a result of 
inaction on his part and should help to prevent adverse election as against 
the plan." Id. 
Clearly, this discussion only deals with the election-in, and there is no 
comparable discussion as to the election-out in the legislative history. 
81 In other words, it is assumed that the regulation is valid where both a 
single participant and a married participant of the same age at retirement with 
the same accrued benefit would receive the same monthly annuity payments during 
their lives. In addition, after the death of the married participant, his surviving 
spouse would continue to receive a survivor annuity of, say, 50 percent of the 
annuity payable to him during their joint lives, or perhaps 50 percent of the 
annuity that would have been payable to him during their joint lives had his 
annuity been reduced for the survivor annuity, without any reduction of the joint 
lives annuity payable to the married participant. 
If, however, the plan provides that a survivor annuity is the only form of 
benefit under the plan, but that the joint life annuity of a married participant 
will be reduced for the cost of such survivor annuity, then arguably the regulations 
are invalid. For example, assume that the straight life annuity is 100 and a 50 
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therefore, the apparent thrust of the legislative history—an employee 
might have "his own retirement benefit" reduced against his voli-
tion82—is satisfied. At least Congress clearly did not want to provide a 
disincentive to employer subsidization of joint and survivor benefits." 
Providing an election-out in such circumstances would create just such a 
disincentive. However, the regulation seems invalid if it permits pre-
clusion of an election-out where the joint lives annuity of a married 
participant is less than the straight life annuity of a single participant 
with the same accrued benefit and life expectancy." Even if the joint 
life annuity is not reduced (so that the regulation might be justified on a 
policy basis), it flies in the face of Code Section 401 (a) (11 ) (E), which 
flatly states that a "plan shall not be treated as satisfying the [qualified 
joint and survivor annuity] requirements . . . unless, under the plan, each 
participant has a reasonable period . . . before the annuity starting date 
during which he may elect in writing . . . not to take such joint and 
survivor annuity." The implication is that a plan must provide an 
optional actuarial equivalent, such as a straight life annuity, to a qualified 
joint and survivor annuity. 
Regardless of the merits of Treasury's policy, unfortunately, plan 
administrators (and perhaps plan sponsors)" who operate a plan drafted 
percent survivor annuity would reduce the joint lives annuity to 80. Assume 
further that the plan provides that the joint life annuity would be 80 and a 
survivor annuity would be 40 where the participant's surviving spouse was, say, 
two years younger than he at normal retirement (sixty-five, under the plan). If, 
in such circumstances, the married participant would receive a joint life annuity 
of only 80 while a single participant with the same accrued benefit would receive 
a straight life annuity of 100, it is arguable that the married participant must be 
given an opportunity to elect-out. In summary, based on the legislative history, 
only where the joint lives annuity of a married participant, following the above 
hypothetical, is 100 and the employer subsidizes the survivor annuity of either 
40 or 50, can providing an election-out be avoided. In such circumstances to 
allow an election-out would give a married participant an opportunity of receiving 
an annuity of, say, 105 or 110 during his life with no survivor annuity. This, 
Congress clearly did not contemplate. 
82 H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, at 279. 
83 H.R. Rep. No. 93-807, at 67. 
84 See note 81 supra. 
85 The term "plan sponsor" is defined in ERISA § 3(16)(B) as (1) the 
employer in the case of a single employer plan, (2) the employee organization 
(i.e., union in the case of a plan established or maintained by an employee orga-
nization); or (3) in the case of a plan established or maintained by two or more 
employers or jointly by one or more employers and one or more employee orga-
nizations (i.e., a Taft-Hartley § 301 plan), the association, committee, joint board 
of trustees, or other similar group or representatives of the parties who establish 
or maintain the plan. 
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to follow the proposed regulations in this context, are certain to face 
litigation by married participants who wish a greater straight life annuity 
benefit. 
Period During Which Postretirement Survivor Annuity Not Required 
H.R. 4200, the Senate bill parent of ERISA, 86 would have required 
merely that a participant could elect to receive any benefit, payable 
under the plan as an annuity, in the form of a joint and survivor annuity. 
Section 1021(a) of H.R. 2, as passed by the House, revealed upon a very 
close reading that a joint and survivor annuity was required only where 
annuity payments to a participant had commenced or where the par-
ticipant died after his earliest retirement age and before payments to him 
had commenced (i.e., his annuity starting date). This provision was 
the genesis of Representative Holtzman's proposed amendment,"' but the 
floor debate disclosed that such limitation was intentional in order to 
minimize increased costs to plans." Code Section 401(a) (11) (B) and 
ERISA Section 205(b) explicitly provide that a "qualified joint and 
survivor annuity" (i.e., a postretirement survivor annuity) is not re-
quired during the period beginning on the date that the employee be-
comes a participant in the plan and ending on the later of the date that 
the employee reaches the earliest retirement age under the plan or ten 
years (the first day of the 120th month) prior to the date on which he 
would reach "normal retirement age," defined as the earliest of 
8" H.R. 4200 is set forth below in Appendix C. 
"Representative Holtzman's amendment would have made I.R.C. § 401(a) 
(11) read in pertinent parts as follows: 
(11)(A) A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this section 
if the plan of which such trust is a part provides for the payment of benefits 
in the form of an annuity and if- 
"(i) the participant and his spouse have been married throughout the 5-
year period ending on the annuity starting date, or 
"(ii) the participant dies after the earliest age at which he acquired 
non fort citable rights, and the participant and his spouse had been married 
throughout the 5-year period ending on the date of his death, .. . 
"(D) for purposes of this paragraph— . . . (iii) the term 'qualified 
joint and survivor annuity' means an annuity for the life of the participant 
with a survivor annuity for the life of his spouse which is not contingent 
upon the survivorship of the participant beyond the earliest age at which he 
acquired any non-forfeitable rights under the plan and which is not less than 
one-half of the amount of the annuity payable during the joint lives of the 
participant and his spouse. . . ." 
See 120 Cong. Rec. H1285 (daily ed., Feb. 28, 1974) (Rep. Holtzman). 
"8 120 Cong. Rec. H1286 (daily ed., Feb. 28, 1974) (Rep. Ullman). 
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(1) The plan definition of normal retirement age, or 
(2) The later of age sixty-five or the tenth anniversary of beginning 
participation." 
Many, if not most, plans define normal retirement age as sixty-five 
and earliest retirement age as fifty-five. For convenience, the Section 
401(a) (11) (B) period will be referred to as the "pre-earliest retirement 
age period," and the period beginning thereafter and ending at normal 
retirement age will be referred to as the "earliest retirement age period." 
The term "earliest retirement age" is defined as the earliest date on which, 
under the plan, the participant could elect to receive retirement benefits. 90 
 This definition, as well as earlier legislative history, dictates that the 
earliest retirement age applies on a person-by-person basis. "Thus, if a 
plan permits retirement as early as age 50 for 30 years of service, but 
otherwise retirement benefits are to be payable only upon attaining age 
65, the earliest retirement age for an employee who began work at 25 
would be age 55." 91 Some plans provide, for example, for early retire-
ment at age fifty and ten years of service with the consent of the com-
pany, or early retirement at age sixty and ten years of service without 
any requirement of company consent. The proposed regulations do not 
clearly speak to whether "election" by an employee means only an elec-
tion by him that does not require company consent. Presumably, earliest 
retirement age is not so limited. 
Possibly, employer consent for early retirement is no longer per-
mitted under the Code. Code Section 401 (a) (14) states that where a 
plan provides for the payment of an early retirement benefit, a partic-
ipant, who has satisfied the service requirement of the early retirement 
benefit but separated from service (with any nonforfeitable right to an 
accrued benefit) before satisfying the age requirement for early retire-
ment, must be permitted upon satisfaction of such age requirement to 
receive at least the normal retirement benefit to which he would have 
been entitled at normal retirement age, actuarially reduced in accordance 
with reasonable actuarial assumptions. A participant, who has satisfied 
any age and service requirements for early retirement (except for em-
ployer consent) but has not yet terminated employment, could obtain 
the same treatment by separating from service and then electing early 
retirement. A question that neither the Code nor the proposed or tem-
porary regulations answer is whether this rule applies to a plan that does 
not state eligibility for early retirement benefits in terms of a service 
89 I.R.C. § 41I(a) (8) and ERISA § 3(24). See Prop. Reg. § 1.401(a)-11 
(d)(I)(i)• 
" I.R.C. § 401(a) (11) (G) (ii); Prop. Reg. § 1.401 (a)-11 (b) (3). 
91 H.R. Rep. No. 84-807 at 67. 
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requirement, but does in terms of an age requirement. Arguably, where 
there is no express service requirement (such as ten years of service) for 
early retirement, every participant upon entry automatically satisfies the 
service requirement of the plan. If this construction of the statute is 
accepted, then in most, if not all, circumstances, employer consent will 
have no effect on the determination of earliest retirement age. 
The pre-earliest retirement age period exclusion from a joint and 
survivor annuity is backed up by Code Section 4 1 1 (a) (3) (A) and 
ERISA Section 203 (a) (3 ) (A), which provide that a right to an ac-
crued benefit derived from employer contributions is not treated as 
forfeitable for purposes of the minimum vesting provisions solely because 
the plan provides that it is not payable (i.e., forfeited) to the extent it 
has not been paid or distributed to the participant prior to his death, 
unless the qualified joint and survivor annuity rules require payment of 
a survivor annuity." Because this provision constitutes, in effect, part 
of the definition of "nonforfeitable," it overrides the "nonforfeitable" or 
complete vesting rule upon termination or partial termination"; but 
operation of such a provision in a plan might not automatically pass the 
antidiscrimination requirements of Code Section 401 (a) (4). 94 Dis-
crimination in operation could conceivably arise where most of the vested 
accrued benefits deferred until normal retirement age that are wiped out 
by death prior to normal retirement age are attributable to rank-and-
file employees, while most of the prohibited group through longevity 
reach earliest retirement age and have an opportunity to elect into a pre-
retirement joint and survivor annuity. 
The proposed regulations patently do not require the payment of a 
postretirement survivor annuity during the pre-earliest retirement age 
period.95 As discussed below, they just as clearly require payment of a 
postretirement survivor annuity as soon as earliest retirement age occurs 
where the participant commenced receiving benefits prior to earliest 
retirement age, and as soon as the payment of benefits commences after 
the end of the pre-earliest retirement age period where the participant 
terminated employment prior thereto." They less obviously address the 
situation where a participant terminates employment prior to his earliest 
retirement age and dies prior to the annuity starting date of his deferred 
vested benefit," although clearly he cannot elect into a survivor annuity 
92 Prop. Reg. § 1.411 (a)-4(b) (1). 
93 I.R.C. § 411 (d) (3). See note 2 supra and accompanying text. 
94 See I.R.C. § 411(d) (1). 
95 Prop. Reg. § 1.401 (a)-11 (d) (1). 
96 Prop. Reg. § 1.401 (a)-11 (d) (2). 
97 Prop. Reg. § 1.401 (a)-11 (d) (3) (iii). 
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after such termination. 98 The legislative history, however, manifests that 
a postretirement survivor annuity must be provided only where annuity 
payments to the participant have commenced (or he has reached normal 
retirement age and not elected-out) or where he has elected into a pre-
retirement survivor annuity and dies prior to his annuity starting date. 
Period During Which a Postretirement Survivor Annuity Kicks In 
If a participant, who has terminated employment, begins to receive 
retirement benefits during the pre-earliest retirement age period, the 
proposed regulations provide that he and his spouse must receive after 
the termination of such period benefits having the effect of a qualified 
joint and survivor annuity. 99 Moreover, if such a participant dies prior 
to such period, his surviving spouse must receive a qualified survivor 
annuity after the date the participant's pre-earliest retirement age period 
would have terminated if the participant had survived.' 
These provisions of the regulations are bottomed on the fact that, 
under ERISA, every retirement life annuity, regardless of the annuity 
starting date, would have to be in the form of a qualified joint and sur-
vivor annuity (if the marriage at annuity starting date and other similar 
98 H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, at 279, provides in pertinent part as follows: 
"In the case of an employee who retires, or who attains normal retire-
ment age, the joint and survivor provision is to apply unless the employee 
elected otherwise. 
"In the case of an employee who is eligible to retire prior to the normal 
retirement age under the plan, and who does not retire, the joint and survivor 
provisions need not be applicable under the plan, unless the employee made 
an affirmative election. Moreover, the plan need not make this option avail-
able until the employee is within 10 years of normal retirement age." 
99 Prop. Reg. § 1.401(a)-11(c) (2) (iii). The proposed regulation gives the 
example of a plan that provides for early retirement after completion of thirty 
years of service, commonly called a thirty-and-out plan. An employee commencing 
employment at age eighteen would be eligible for early retirement at age forty-
eight; if the normal retirement age of the plan were age sixty-five, then it would 
be seven years before "earliest retirement age" under the plan—at which point 
the survivor annuity requirement attaches. The regulation explains that in such 
circumstances, unless the employee otherwise elects, the plan must provide a 
qualified joint and survivor annuity to the employee and his spouse after he 
reaches age fifty-five or after the date that he would have reached age fifty-five if 
he had survived. Prop. Reg. § 1.401(a)-11(d) (2) (iii). Another example would 
be disability retirement prior to age fifty-five. 
100 Prop. Reg. § 401 (a)-11(d) (2) (i). These situations highlight the necessity 
of a plan's requiring as prerequisite to the payment of a survivor annuity that the 
surviving spouse have been married to the participant at the annuity starting date. 
Otherwise, such a participant during the potentially long period prior to the earliest 
retirement age period may marry or remarry and his surviving spouse be entitled 
to the surviving annuity. Conversely, the plan designer also may wish to require 
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preconditions were met and there was no election-out), but for the Sec-
tion 401(a) (11) (B) pre-earliest retirement age period exception, which 
explicitly only exempts a plan from providing a qualified joint and 
survivor annuity during such pre-earliest retirement age period. Once 
that period is over, the general rule under Code Section 401(a) (11) (E) 
providing for an election-out nicely falls into place in this context. A 
participant commencing to receive a life annuity during the pre-earliest 
retirement age period (during which the plan does not have to provide 
a postretirement survivor annuity) must be given an opportunity prior 
to his annuity starting date to elect-out of a qualified joint and survivor 
annuity as to the period commencing upon the termination of his pre-
earliest retirement age period. 101 Thus, the election period would be 
computed with reference to the annuity starting date and not the later 
date that the "earliest retirement period" commenced. This is an exceed-
ingly intricate provision, but required by the statute. 
Also, where a participant terminates employment and begins to 
receive benefits after termination of his pre-earliest retirement age, he 
and his spouse must receive benefits having the effect of a qualified joint 
and survivor annuity unless he has elected-out. 102 As discussed above, 
however, after termination of such period, but prior to the annuity 
starting date, a terminated or separated participant who had not begun 
to receive life annuity payments would not be able to elect into a qual-
ified joint and survivor annuity. However, if such a terminated partici-
pant had satisfied the plan's service requirement for early retirement, he 
could elect early retirement at earliest retirement age under the plan and 
thus obtain a postretirement survivor annuity. 
Preretirement (Election-In) Survivor Annuity 
Congress reasoned that if an employee could obtain survivor 
annuity protection for his spouse only by retirement, including early 
that the surviving spouse have been married to the participant at the time of his 
death, because otherwise a divorced spouse who was married at the annuity 
starting date might claim that he or she was entitled to a survivor annuity. The 
one potentiality concerning divorce, marriage, and remarriage that the regulations 
clearly preclude a plan from covering is that of cutting off the surviving spouse 
if he or she remarries after the participant's death. See Prop. Reg. § 1.401(a)-
11(b)(1). 
101 See I.R.C. § 411(a) (l 1) (E). This explains the otherwise puzzling impact 
of this provision upon an early retirement or disability more than ten years prior 
to normal retirement age or a disability retirement prior to such period. An 
election-out is provided even though at such time there is no survivor annuity; 
the survivor annuity attaches only after earliest retirement age. 
102 prop. Reg. § 1.401(a)-11(b) (2) (ii). 
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retirement (as discussed above), and its attendant mandatory postre-
tirement joint and survivor annuity, there would be an "unwarranted 
artificial incentive" to exercise early retirement rights if available. 103 
 Congress "concluded that it was preferable not to provide an artificial 
stimulus to exercise of these rights (or an added cost to the providing 
of these rights) of the sort that would result from requiring a survivor 
annuity to be paid only when the basic annuity was already in pay 
status." 104 This was the genesis of the preretirement survivor annuity. 
Election-In Requirement 
Code Section 401(a) (11) (C) and ERISA Section 205(c) (1) 
literally mandate that any plan that provides for the payment of (life 
annuity) benefits before the normal retirement age also must provide a 
participant with a reasonable period during which he may elect into a 
survivor annuity to be payable on his death if it occurs during the period 
beginning with the date on which the pre-earliest retirement age period 
ends and ending on the date he reaches normal retirement age "if he 
continues his employment during that period."'" In short, the election-in 
survivor annuity may be viewed as a "boots on" survivor annuity—it 
applies where the participant dies before retirement ("with his boots 
on") after reaching his earliest retirement age under the plan. The joint 
and survivor or election-out annuity, in contrast, applies only where the 
participant has retired and then dies. 
The election-in period is parallel to the election-out period. The 
election-in period must begin no later than ninety days before the end 
of the pre-earliest retirement age period.'" Where a plan uses the up-to-
two-year waiting period limitation on elections, discussed below, the 
ninety-day election period is added to the end of the waiting period. 107 
 The seven days and content requirements of the written explanation and 
furnishing of financial effect information by the plan administrator are 
identical to the election-out notification requirements. 108  
103 H.R. Rep. No. 93-807, at 67. 
104 Id. 
1°5 Prop. Reg. § 1.401 (a)-11 (d) (3) (i) (A). 
1" Prop. Reg. § 1.401 (a)-11 (d) (3) (iii). 
107 "For example, if a plan provides that an election made under this sub-
paragraph does not become effective if the participant dies less than 2 years after 
the date of such election, the period for making an election under this paragraph 
must begin not later than 2 years and 90 days before the date on which the 
period described in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph ends." Prop. Reg. § 
1.401(a)-11(d)(iii). 
108 Prop. Reg. §§ 1.401(a)-11(d)(3)(iv)(A) and 1.401(a)-11(d)(3)(iv) 
(B). 
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Continued Employment 
Code Section 401(a) (11) (C) provides that a "plan described in 
subparagraph (B) [one that provides for payment of benefits before 
normal retirement age] does not meet the requirements of subparagraph 
(A) [benefits payable in the form of an annuity must be payable in a 
form having the effect of a qualified joint and survivor annuity] unless, 
under the plan, a participant has a reasonable period during which he 
may elect the qualified joint and survivor annuity form with respect to 
the period beginning on the date on which the period described in sub-
paragraph (B) ends [the later of the date the employee reaches the 
earliest retirement age under the plan or the first day of the 120th month 
beginning before the date on which the employee reaches normal retire-
ment age] and ending on the date on which he reaches normal retirement 
age . . . if he continues his employment during that period." (Emphasis 
added.) 
There are at least three possible constructions of the "continued 
employment" requirement in the context of an election-in. The first is 
that the continued employment requirement refers only to the period 
during which the election-in may be made. Under this construction, 
once a participant terminated his employment, he would not be permitted 
to make an election-in unless he was subsequently reemployed; but, 
presumably, if an election-in had already been made prior to termina-
tion, the election would continue in effect until normal retirement age 
or, if earlier, the date to which payment of the deferred vested benefit 
was postponed. The second construction is that the phrase "continues 
his employment during that period" modifies only normal retirement age. 
Under this reading, the phrase would apply primarily to situations in 
which normal retirement age requires both an age and a service require-
ment. The third construction is that survivor annuity payments under 
the qualified joint and survivor annuity would not be made if a partici-
pant had terminated his employment prior to his death. 
The proposed regulations appear to adopt the first construction. In 
Proposed Treasury Regulations Section 1.401 (a)-11 (d) (3) (i) (A), the 
draftsmen of the regulations follow a paraphrase of the statute quoted 
above with the statement that "breaks in service during that period will 
neither invalidate a previous election or revocation nor prevent an elec-
tion from being made or revoked during the election period." The 
easiest, but not sole, reading of this provision is that if a participant who 
has elected-in subsequently terminates his employment and incurs a 
break in service, the previous election will continue to be valid. Thus, 
if he dies prior to his normal retirement age, his surviving spouse will 
receive a survivor annuity. A further indication that the proposed reg-
ulations adopt this interpretation is that the election period for an 
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election-in, as a general rule, is the period beginning not later than ninety 
days before the date on which the pre-earliest retirement age period 
ends "and ending on the date the participant terminates his employ-
ment." 109 If an election-in had no effect once a participant terminated 
his employment, there would be no need to cut off the right to so elect 
with termination of service. In addition, the proposed regulations also 
illustrate these provisions with an example in which the "plan must allow 
a participant who continues his employment [after the earliest retirement 
age under the plan] to elect a survivor annuity . . . to be payable on the 
death of the participant if death occurs after . . . the earliest retirement 
age . . . but before the date the participant reaches normal retirement 
age (age 65)." 110 Again, continued employment seems only a prereq-
uisite to electing. 
The construction of continued employment as merely modifying 
normal retirement age can only be reached by a strained reading. If 
continued employment meant that normal retirement age (and, hence, 
end of the election-in period) could be attained only by employees who 
actually reached normal retirement age while satisfying any service 
requirement, then the election-in period would never end as to employees 
who terminated employment prior to attaining the service requirements 
for a normal retirement age within both age and service requirements, 
such as attainment of age sixty-five and completion of ten years of 
service. If the phrase were intended as a constructive satisfaction of any 
service requirement, then it more properly would have read "if he con-
tinued his employment during that period." Thus, one may conclude 
that the continued employment requirement does not have any relation-
ship to normal retirement age. 
The construction of continued employment as a prerequisite for 
payment of an election-in survivor annuity arises under a reading of the 
statute in which the qualified joint and survivor annuity form is payable 
with respect to the period beginning on the date which the pre-earliest 
retirement age period ends and ending on the date that he reaches 
normal retirement age only if the participant continues employment dur-
ing that period (until his death). This reading is not particularly strained 
and, on a limited policy basis, could be justified as consistent with the 
obvious goal of obtaining parity between a participant who had attained 
earliest retirement age and did not retire and a participant who did retire 
at such age. For, a terminated participant usually is not permitted to 
take early retirement after attainment of the earliest retirement age if he 
is no longer employed by the company (unless he has satisfied any 
service requirement for early retirement). Moreover, the statute does 
109 Prop. Reg. § 1.401 (a)-11 (d) (3) (iii). 
110 Prop. Reg. § 1.401 (a)-11 (d) (3) (ii).  
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not require that a terminated employee with a deferred vested account 
who terminated employment prior to earliest retirement age and prior to 
the availability of an election-in be afforded an opportunity to elect-in to 
a qualified joint and survivor annuity. The proposed regulations could 
even be read as consistent with this construction if the provision that 
breaks in service during the earliest retirement age period do not in-
validate a previous election were read as simply providing that, to use 
pre-ERISA terminology, there is no "continuous service" requirement, 111 
 the participant only need be employed at his death during the election-in 
period; that is, prior breaks in service so long as followed by subsequent 
reemployment are of no consequence. 
While the payment contingent on continued employment reading 
is a permissible reading, is supported or, perhaps better, not contradicted, 
by the purpose of the election-in provision (not to provide an unwar-
rented incentive to a participant employed after his earliest retirement 
age to elect early retirement), and both the Code provision and the 
provisions in the regulations are ambiguous to a degree, the draftsmen 
of the legislation properly chose the first construction, albeit ambig-
uously. Otherwise, a participant who has attained earliest retirement 
age and who has elected into a joint and survivor annuity benefit would 
be greatly surprised to find that his election-in would no longer be effec-
tive if he were discharged prior to normal retirement age. Consequently, 
the first construction of this provision is likely to prevail, although it is 
hoped that the final regulations will more clearly illustrate that this is 
the construction the draftsmen chose. This construction, of course, will 
result in greater costs to be borne by the plan sponsor if it subsidizes 
survivor annuities or by the remaining participants who elect-in and 
survive until normal retirement age. 
Continued employment is only a requirement in the context of a 
preretirement survivor annuity. A participant who has reached earliest 
retirement age under the plan would be able (since by definition he 
would have satisfied any service and age requirement for early retire-
ment) to terminate his employment and then elect early retirement as 
discussed above. Such early retirement would trigger a postretirement 
survivor annuity, unless the participant elected-out. However, many 
participants probably would not elect early retirement, even though they 
terminated their employment, in order to avoid the actuarial reduction 
for an early retirement benefit. In such circumstances, the question 
whether there is a continued employment at death requirement for a 
preretirement survivor annuity becomes critical. 
111 Pre-ERISA plans frequently required as a condition for credited service 
for purposes of vesting or eligibility, for example, that the employee have contin-
uous employment, unbroken by a break in service. 
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Amount of Preretirement Survivor Annuity 
Floor on Election-In Survivor Annuity 
By virtue of the last sentence of Code Section 401(a) (11) (C) 
and of ERISA Section 205 (c) (2) , the payments under the election-in 
preretirement survivor annuity can be no less than "the payments which 
would have been made under the joint annuity to which the participant' 
would have been entitled, if he had elected-in immediately prior to his 
retirement (which is deemed to have occurred on the day before his 
death and within the period within which an election can be made). 
Three possible interpretations of this provision would be that the 
survivor annuity cannot be less than 
(1) "[T]he [survivor annuity] payments that would have been made 
under the joint [and survivor] annuity to which the participant 
[and his surviving spouse] would have been entitled ... ," in 
which case the survivor annuity would be the actuarial equiv-
alent of the survivor annuity only of the joint and survivor 
annuity; 
(2) "[T]he payments which would have been made under the 
joint [and survivor] annuity to which the participant [and his 
spouse] would have been entitled ... ," in which case the 
survivor annuity could be no less than the actuarial equiv-
alent of a single life annuity for the life of the participant; or 
(3) "[T]he payments which would have been made under the joint 
annuity to which the participant would have been entitled 
[during the joint lives of him and his surviving spouse]," in 
which case the survivor annuity could be no less than the 
actuarial equivalent of the joint lives annuity reduced for the 
survivor annuity. 
These three alternatives may be illustrated by applying them to the 
following hypothetical taken from the proposed regulations: "A partici-
pant is entitled to a single life annuity of $100 per month or a reduced 
amount under a qualified joint and survivor annuity of $80 per 
month...." 112  Under the first construction, the election-in preretirement 
survivor annuity could be no less than $40; under the second, no less 
than $100; and under the third, no less than $80. 
Only the third alternative is consistent with the literal language of 
the statute. However, the proposed regulations have chosen the first 
alternative: 
11a Prop. Reg. § 1.401(a)-11(d) (3) (v). 
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For example, if a participant is entitled to a single life annuity of $100 
per month or a reduced amount under a qualified joint and survivor 
annuity of $80 per month, regardless of when he makes a valid 
election [-in] . . . his spouse is entitled to a payment of at least $40, 
but not more than $80 per month, under the survivor annuity. 118 
The strongest policy argument in favor of the proposed regulation's 
choice of a 50 percent survivor annuity floor is that upon retirement the 
survivor annuity may be as low as 50 percent of the joint (lives) annuity 
(with it being unclear whether the particular percentage must be a 
matter of participant choice or can be predetermined by plan design) 
and the preretirement surviving spouse should fare no better. Further-
more, under the House bill the survivor annuity upon either a pre- or 
postretirement death of the participant would have been the survivor 
annuity of a "qualified joint and survivor annuity" with a 50 percent 
floor. 
An argument in favor of the second alternate of a floor which is the 
actuarial equivalent of a single life annuity for the life of the participant, 
is that a qualified joint and survivor annuity must constitute such 
equivalent; since there will be no joint lives annuity when the participant 
dies prior to retirement, the survivor annuity alone in such circumstances 
should constitute such equivalent. This argument on a policy basis has 
merit, for, under the "in lieu of other compensation" concept, a preretire-
ment survivor annuity should constitute such equivalent—the surviving 
spouse should receive the vested accrued value that the participant would 
have received—and, in many defined contribution plans, the surviving 
spouse does receive the accrued benefit of the participant (his account 
balance) upon his death. However, such construction requires almost 
as many emendations of the received text as the first construction. 
The third alternate of a floor of 100 percent of the joint lives an-
nuity payable during the life of the participant (which is less than a 
straight life annuity since reduced for the survivor annuity), is the only 
natural reading of the statute. "[J]oint annuity to which the participant 
would have been entitled" clearly refers to "the annuity payable during 
the joint lives of the participant and his spouse" to which the participant 
would have been entitled had he elected-in, and then retired on the day 
before his death. Assuming no drafting error, it is probable that the 
statute limited the 100 percent floor to the joint lives annuity rather 
than the greater participant's single life annuity in order to achieve 
more parity with the same age participant who had elected early retire-
ment; the 100 percent floor of the statute rather than 50 percent floor, 
on the other hand, probably reflects a desire to put the surviving spouse 
113 Id. 
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more nearly in the shoes of the participant when he never retired and 
did not receive any of his annuity. 
The proposed regulations probably chose an election-in 50 percent 
floor on the theory that the 100 percent joint lives floor in Section 401 
(a) (11) (C) constituted a drafting error—the election-in and -out floors 
were intended to be identical. Regardless of whether that is the case, or 
whether the 50 percent floor is preferable as a policy matter, the regula-
tion's choice places plan administrators and sponsors in an unfortunate 
position: if the plan adopts the 50 percent floor sanctioned by the reg-
ulations, a well-informed surviving spouse of a deceased participant who 
elected-in may well sue for a 100 percent floor survivor annuity under 
Title I, as required by the statute. The only safe answers are for plans 
to provide a 100 percent floor or for Congress to implement remedial 
legislation. 
If a plan provides an employer-subsidized postretirement joint and 
survivor annuity, an interesting question arises as to whether the pre-
retirement survivor annuity must be equal to the subsidized survivor 
annuity benefit. For example, following the above discussed hypothetical 
of the straight life annuity being 100 and the joint lives annuity being 
80 where the survivor annuity is 40, assume that a plan provides that at 
retirement the joint lives annuity is 100 and the surviving spouse is 
given a subsidized annuity of, say, 50. The question is whether under 
the proposed regulations the election-in survivor annuity must be 50 or 
whether it can be 40. As a policy matter, the employer should be per-
mitted to subsidize one survivor annuity and not another, since it is not 
required to subsidize either. However, the statute measures the election-
in survivor annuity, according to the regulations, by reference to the 
survivor annuity that the surviving spouse would have had had the par-
ticipant retired the day before his death.'" Presumably, were the plan 
to say nothing else, the participant would have had a joint lives benefit 
of 100 and his surviving spouse would have had a survivor annuity of 
50 had he retired on the day before his death. Apparently, however, 
the plan can provide that for purposes of an election-in survivor annuity, 
the retirement benefit to which the participant would have been entitled 
immediately before his death (and the nonsubsidized survivor annuity to 
which his spouse would have been entitled) will differ from the unre-
duced joint lives retirement benefit and subsidized survivor annuity of an 
actual retirement. Hopefully, some less awkward drafting means of 
accomplishing the same objective would be permitted under the final 
regulations. 
The probably more significant question whether the preretirement 
114 See notes 149 and 150 infra and accompanying text. 
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survivor annuity can be actuarially reduced for the "cost of coverage" 
from earliest retirement age until the participant's death prior to normal 
retirement age is discussed below under "Actuarial Costs." 
Ceiling on Preretirement Survivor Annuity 
The proposed regulations may impose a 100 percent of the hypo-
thetical joint lives annuity ceiling upon the preretirement survivor an-
nuity parallel to the statutory ceiling on the postretirement survivor 
annuity.' Code Section 401(a) (11) (C) does not speak explicitly to 
any ceiling. While such a ceiling is required as to the "standard benefit" 
(joint and postretirement survivor annuity), where it poses no problems, 
there is argument that it is not required as to an election-in preretirement 
survivor annuity. The reasoning is that the term "survivor annuity" is 
not defined in the statute, only the term "qualified joint and survivor 
annuity." In the case of an election-in, by definition there is no joint lives 
annuity since the participant does not receive payments during the joint 
lives of himself and his spouse. The "definition" of a preretirement 
survivor annuity is found in Code Section 401(a) (11) (C), which re-
quires that "the payments under the survivor annuity are not less than 
the payments that would have been made under the joint annuity which 
the participant would have been entitled if he made an election .. . 
immediately prior to his retirement and if his retirement had occurred 
on a day before his death and within the period within which an election 
can be made." This language contains a floor on the preretirement sur-
vivor annuity, but not a ceiling. 
In summary, arguably there is no 100 percent ceiling on the elec-
tion-in survivor annuity. The proposed and temporary regulations 
appear confusing on this point. The main body of the regulations as 
to payments under the preretirement survivor annuity speaks only to a 
floor: 
[I]f an election is made, the payments under the survivor annuity must 
not be less than the payments that would have been made under the 
joint survivor to annuity to which the surviving spouse would have been 
entitled if the participant had made the election . . . immediately prior 
to his retirement. . . . 116 
However, the example accompanying this statement in the regula-
tions provides that "if a participant is entitled to a single life annuity of 
$100 per month or reduced annuity of $80 a month, . . . his spouse is 
entitled to a payment of at least $40 but not more than $80 per month, 
115 Prop. Reg. § 1.401 (a)-11 (d) (3) (v). 
118 pro- . p Reg. § 1.401(a)-11(d) (3) (B) (v). 
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under the survivor annuity." 1 1 7 If this is intended merely as an illustra-
tion of a particular plan and not as a limitation of a preretirement 
survivor annuity to a joint lives ceiling, the example is particularly un-
fortunate. 
The counterargument, based on the statute, is that the election-in 
constitutes a right to "elect the qualified joint and survivor annuity form," 
and such form clearly contains a 100 percent ceiling. In any event, 
such a 100 percent of the joint lives annuity ceiling on the preretirement 
survivor annuity poses potential drafting and administrative problems 
for plans other than "uninsured" defined benefit plans, such as defined 
contributions plans or insurance contract defined benefit plans, that 
typically provide a survivor's death benefit equal to the participant's 
account or reserve. Such death benefit would be in excess of any 100 
percent of the joint lives annuity ceiling, so that if such a ceiling were 
imposed, participants might have to be given a meaningless, but admin-
istratively costly (due to explanation requirements), election to give 
their spouse a greater death benefit over a lesser survivor annuity. The 
point is that defined contribution plans that seek to eliminate the costs 
of providing notice and explanations (since they already automatically 
provide a survivor benefit) may wish to always provide a "survivor an-
nuity" in order to avoid giving notice of elections and, most importantly, 
to avoid the cost of actuarial studies of the dollars and cents effect upon 
a participant where the plan would not otherwise need the services of an 
actuary. An alternative may be available in that a surviving spouse may 
elect to have benefits paid in a form other than a qualified joint and 
survivor annuity, 118 with no apparent requirement of a "written explana-
tion" so that the plan may provide a preretirement survivor annuity 
equal to 100 percent of the joint lives annuity and give the surviving 
spouse an optional death benefit, i.e., the full account balance or reserve, 
as the case may be. 
Where No Election-In Is Required 
Proposed Treasury Regulations Section 1.401- (a)11 (d ) (3) (i) (B) 
provides that if a survivor annuity is the only form of benefit payable 
under the plan, no election-in need be provided. The Conference Report 
similarly states that a plan may provide that a joint and survivor annuity 
is the only form of benefit payable under the plan, in which case no 
election-in need be provided.'" Literally, however, Code Section 401 
117 1d. 
118 Prop. Reg. § 1.401 (a) -1 I (a) ( I ) . 
118 H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, at 279. 
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(a) (11) (C) and ERISA Section 205 (c) indicate that the election-in 
option must be provided as to any plan which provides for prenormal 
retirement age benefits (which is consistent with the rationale for the 
election-in—to avoid any artificial stimulus to take early retirement in 
order to obtain survivor annuity protection). On the other hand, it 
could be argued also that the reference in Code Section 401(a) (11) (C) 
to a "plan described in subparagraph (B)" means a plan that provides 
prenormal retirement age benefits but does not provide a survivor an-
nuity as to the pre-earliest retirement age period (which Code Section 
401 (a) (11) (B) sanctions). Under this reading, the language of the 
statute would imply that an election-in must be provided unless the plan 
provides for a mandatory joint and survivor annuity as to the pre-earliest 
retirement age period as well as during the earliest retirement age period 
itself. This reading is supported by the statement in the Conference 
Report as to there being no need for an election-in; presumably, the 
plan must provide that a preretirement survivor annuity is always payable 
from participation (or earliest retirement age?), and, possibly, at actual 
retirement the only benefit must be a qualified joint and postretirement 
survivor annuity (with no election-out). The proposed and temporary 
regulations do not clarify these points. 
While this approach has surface simplicity, other elements of the 
legislative history indicate that a plan might not be able to provide a 
mandatory joint and survivor annuity (with no election-out) during the 
period beginning with earliest retirement age and ending on normal 
retirement age. New Code Section 401(a) (11) (A) (ii), as set forth in 
Section 1021 of H.R. 2, as passed by the House, would have required 
a plan to provide for the payment of annuity benefits in a form having 
the effect of a qualified joint and survivor annuity if a participant died 
after his earliest retirement age and before the annuity starting date 
(provided that the participant and his spouse had been married through-
out the five-year period ending on the date of his death). This provision 
obviously required a mandatory survivor annuity where the participant 
met the other qualifications, even if he had not retired on or after his 
earliest retirement age where he died before his annuity starting date. 
Under standard legislative construction, where this mandatory require-
ment was abandoned in final Code Section 401(a) (11) (B) and re-
placed by an optional election-in, a strong legislative history argument 
could be made that a mandatory survivor annuity during this period is 
certainly not required by statute and probably not permitted. 
Moreover, the Conference Report seems to support in other places 
an argument that a plan may not require a mandatory survivor option 
since it states that "these [election-in] rules should help to avoid the 
situation where an employee who had not yet retired might have his 
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own retirement benefit reduced as a result of inaction on his part. . . 120 
This would seem to refer to the fact that Congress did not intend to 
require a plan to "subsidize a joint and survivor annuity." If a plan 
could charge, i.e., reduce the retirement benefit of, all participants who 
survive the period from earliest retirement age to normal retirement age 
and who retired at normal retirement age with a pro-rata portion of the 
costs as to a mandatory survivor annuity protection during this period, 121 
 the result would be that an employee who had not yet retired would have 
his own retirement benefit reduced without action on his part. This 
would not be the result, however, in a defined contribution or insurance 
contract plan, or in a defined benefit plan if the employer bears the 
cost; that is, the straight life annuity of a single participant and the joint 
life annuity of a married participant of an equal life expectancy and 
accrued benefit are actuarially equivalent. As a policy matter, such 
plans should be able to provide a mandatory survivor annuity, as the 
proposed regulations permit. Despite the contrary implications of the 
statute, this provision is likely to be upheld by reason of the passage 
in the Committee Report cited above, at least where the retirement 
benefit of the participant would not be reduced for the cost of his pre-
retirement annuity benefit. 
Preretirement Survivor Annuity and Terminated Participants 
Under Code Section 401 (a) (14) and ERISA Section 205 (a), a 
plan must provide that, unless a participant otherwise elects, payment 
to him of benefits under the plan will begin not later than the sixtieth 
day after the close of the plan year in which ( 1 ) the participant attains 
the earlier of age sixty-five or plan normal retirement age; (2) the tenth 
anniversary of the year in which the participant commenced participa-
tion in the plan occurred; or (3 ) the participant terminated service with 
his employer. 122 Many plans provided under old law, and will continue 
to provide under this provision, that payment of a vested benefit of a 
participant who has separated from service will be deferred until his 
normal retirement age. By virtue of Code Section 401(a) (11) (B) and 
ERISA Section 205 (b), the plan would not have to provide a survivor 
annuity as to such a withdrawn participant for the pre-earliest retirement 
age period. In addition, under Code Section 401(a) (11 ) (C) and 
ERISA Section 205 (c), the plan would not have to provide him an 
election-in to a joint and survivor as to the period beginning with earliest 
retirement age and ending on normal retirement age, since he is not.  
120 Id. 
121 "Recommendations on Spouse Options" at 27,023. 
122 See Prop. Reg. § l.401(a)-(14)(a). 
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continuing his employment during such period. As a consequence, no 
preretirement survivor annuity has to be provided as to a deferred vested 
accrued benefit of a withdrawn participant until the annuity starting date 
of such benefit. As discussed above, the death of such a terminated 
employee prior to the annuity starting date of his deferred vested benefit 
relieves a plan of any statutory obligation to provide a survivor annuity. 
Moreover, Code Section 411(a) (3) (A) and ERISA Section 203(a) 
(3) (A) do not require a different result by virtue of the minimum vest-
ing standards. However, as discussed above, it is conceivable that in 
some circumstances the antidiscrimination requirements of Section 401 
(a) (4) might require a survivor annuity at least as to the present value 
of the accrued vested benefit in some circumstances and at least after 
attainment of early retirement age. 
Preretirement Survivor Annuities and Defined Contribution Plans 
As discussed in the Introduction, defined contribution plans under 
prior law commonly provided that a participant's account was fully 
vested upon his death or disability prior to normal retirement age, and 
also frequently provided that, at retirement, a participant's account bal-
ance could be applied under several alternative options, usually includ-
ing a lump-sum distribution, the purchase of a straight life annuity, or 
combinations thereof. 123 With this background, two questions arise: 
(1) May defined contribution plans take advantage of the broad excep-
tions to survivor annuities contained in ERISA; and (2) conversely, 
assuming that defined contribution plans retain full vesting of the par-
ticipant's account balance on death or disability, what effect do the joint 
and survivor affirmative rules have upon such plans? 
Code Section 411(a) (3) (A) and ERISA Section 203(a) (3) (A), 
in providing that the right to an accrued benefit derived from employer 
contributions shall not be treated as forfeitable solely because under 
the plan it is not payable if the participant dies (except in the case of 
a survivor annuity which is payable as provided in the qualified joint 
and survivor annuity provisions), do not distinguish between defined 
contribution and defined benefit plans. Therefore, for purposes of the 
minimum vesting provisions, a defined contribution plan need not pro-
vide that a participant's account balance from employer contributions 
be fully vested upon his death or that a survivor annuity be available 
except where required by the qualified joint and survivor benefit rules, 
that is, an election-in at earliest retirement age and the standard joint 
and survivor annuity benefit after earliest retirement age (whether as 
123 See notes 5 through 7 supra and accompanying text. 
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to disability or early retirement or normal retirement) for any annuity 
payment. In particular, a participant's vested account balance, payment 
of which is deferred until normal retirement age, could be forfeited in 
a defined contribution plan under the above provisions if a participant 
died prior to normal retirement age. Had Congress thought about this, 
it surely would have distinguished between defined contribution and 
defined benefit plans, since the balancing aspect of making the plan into 
an insurance plan would not be applicable here, at least if a defined 
contribution plan were required to fully vest a participant in his account 
balance (in lieu of a survivor annuity). However, Congress failed to 
appreciate the distinction between the two types of plans, as is the 
general situation throughout ERISA. That being the case, there may 
well be plans currently providing that account balances are fully vested 
in the event of death or permanent disability, that inequitably may wish 
to provide that such account balances are forfeited except where the 
survivor annuity provisions apply; in which case, the account balance 
would be applied to the purchase of a survivor annuity (with the balance 
of the account balance being forfeited). 
The first question is whether Code Section 411(a) (10) and ERISA 
Section 203(c) (1) would apply to a plan amendment deleting full vesting 
of account balances upon death or disability and substituting a survivor 
benefit only where required under joint and survivor annuity rules. Code 
Section 411(a) (10) (A) provides that a plan amendment changing 
any vesting schedule under the plan shall not be treated as satisfying 
the minimum vesting requirements of 411(a) (2) if the nonforfeitable 
percentage of the accrued benefit derived from employer contributions 
of any employee who is a participant under the plan is less than such 
nonforfeitable percentage computed under the plan without regard to 
such amendment. Code Section 411(a) (b) in turn provides that any 
participant with not less than five years of service must be permitted 
to elect to have his nonforfeitable percentage computed under the plan 
without regard to such amendment in order for the plan amendment 
changing any vesting schedule to be treated as satisfying the require-
ments of Code Section 411(a) (2). The catch is that since Code Sec-
tion 411(a) (3) (A) provides that "a right to an accrued benefit derived 
from employer contributions shall not be treated as forfeitable solely 
because the plan provides that it is not payable if the participant dies 
(except in the case of a survivor annuity payable as provided in Code 
Section 401(a) (11) )," in ERISA terms, there has not been a change 
in the "nonforfeitable percentage" of the accrued benefit by virtue of 
such an amendment, since an accrued benefit that is not payable by 
reason of death is not treated as being forfeitable. Thus, it is difficult 
to say that the nonforfeitable interest of the participant has decreased, 
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and, in any event, Code Section 411(a) (10) speaks to a change in 
the "nonforfeitable percentage" of the accrued benefit. Similar reason-
ing applies to the provisions of Title I. Whether this would also be the 
case where the plan changed from, say, a lump-sum death benefit to 
a survivor annuity is a harder question. 
As discussed above, it is possible, however, that the nondiscrim-
ination requirements of Code Section 401(a) (4) might apply to such 
an amendment. This may be the only resort of a participant who finds 
that he has been deprived of the right to a vested account balance pay-
able upon death or disability through amendments adopting instead 
the minimum survivor annuity, since, by virtue of the preemption provi-
sions of ERISA Section 514(a), only ERISA applies to the substantive 
issue. 
Permitted Antiadverse Selection Rules: 
Marriage Requirements 
The joint and survivor annuity provisions of H.R. 2, as passed 
by the House, provided that a plan was not required to provide a sur-
vivor annuity unless the employee had been married throughout the 
five-year period ending on the annuity starting date or, in the case of 
a participant who died after his earliest retirement age before the annuity 
starting date, the participant and his spouse had been married through-
out the five-year period ending on the date of his death. This was done, 
according to the House Ways and Means Committee Report, so that 
plans could provide reasonable protection against adverse selection such 
as might occur, "for example, where a single person 'marries' imme-
diately before retirement, retires, and then chooses to take heavily sub-
sidized joint and survivor benefits in the form of a lump-sum distribution. 
Although your committee's bill does not require joint and survivor 
benefits to be subsidized (i.e., to be in excess of the actuarial value of 
a single-life annuity), neither does your committee wish to provide a 
disincentive to such subsidized benefits." 124 
This five-year waiting period was criticized heavily by Representa-
tive Shirley Chisholm (D-N.Y.). She suggested that the election-out 
provision of the House bill should require approval of both spouses, 
and, in addition, she thought that the five-year marriage period ending 
on the annuity starting date, or on the date of the death of the participant 
who did not retire at early retirement age requirement, was unreason-
able. In her opinion, the incidence of May-December marriages based 
upon statistics was not large at all. "It is an insulting restriction upon 
124 H.R. Rep. No. 94-807, at 67. 
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our senior citizens and could work a real hardship on older 'newly-
weds.' "125 She had been informed upon earlier inquiry that the require-
ment was included to protect a pension fund from being drained by 
survivors who marry participants much older than themselves. Allegedly, 
this had been a problem with survivors of black-lung patients. 
"This may happen on occasion, but I do not believe that the incidence 
of May-December weddings is really any of our business. It is a bit 
of an insult to any older citizens to suggest that we have any business 
in placing restrictions upon whom and when they should marry. 
"While it may be interesting to take this issue to court to see what 
kind of opinion Justice Douglas might write, I would suggest that the 
Section be deleted before it has to be taken to court." 126 
Code Section 401 (a) (11) (D) and ERISA Section 205(d) have 
shortened the five-year marriage requirement to an optional one-year 
marriage requirement. Thus, a plan may, but is not required to, provide 
that the spouse of a participant is not entitled to receive a survivor 
annuity (whether or not the participant had elected-in as to the period 
between earliest retirement age and normal retirement age), unless the 
participant and his spouse have been married throughout the one-year 
period "ending on the date of such participant's death." In contrast, 
the Conference Report states that "when a plan provides for a retire-
ment benefit in the form of an annuity, and the participant has been 
married for the one-year period ending on the annuity starting date, 
the plan must provide for a joint and survivor annuity." The problem 
here is that sound administrative and proper plan drafting demand that 
a plan be able to require the surviving spouse to have been married to 
the participant at two points: the annuity starting date (in the case of 
the standard joint and survivor benefit at retirement, whether disability, 
early or normal), and the date of death (primarily for the election-in 
preretirement survivor annuity). Only with an annuity-starting-date 
marriage requirement can the plan handle the problems arising where 
a participant begins to receive his retirement annuity payments and 
then later either marries a second spouse, or marries for the first time 
a spouse as to whose life expectancy no reduction has been made in his 
now joint lives annuity. The one-year marriage requirement at death, 
in turn, is needed to forestall the adverse selection problems of election-
in. Its use with a standard joint and survivor annuity benefit primarily 
would be to handle problems of divorce. The proposed regulations 
125 120 Cong. Rec. H1334 (daily ed., Feb. 28, 1974) (Rep. Chisholm). 
126 Id. 
127 H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, at 279 (emphasis added). 
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acknowledge the necessity of permitting a marriage requirement at two 
points by providing that a "plan shall be treated as satisfying the require-
ments of this section even though it requires the participant and his 
spouse to have been married to each other on the annuity starting 
date." 128 
The House bill also had taken such a bifurcated approach by turn-
ing the five-year waiting period on the annuity starting date where the 
benefit was in pay status (whether by reason of retirement or by reason 
of disability) and, in contrast, by measuring the five-year waiting period 
with reference to the date of the participant's death where he died after 
his earliest retirement age but before the annuity starting date. 
The above-cited passage in the Conference Report apparently refers 
to the mandatory joint and survivor annuity where the joint lives annuity 
is in pay status, and not to the preretirement survivor annuity. In con-
trast, the drafters of the statute, surely in an oversight, refer only to 
the one-year period ending on the date of the participant's death, that, 
in proper legislative drafting, would have been limited to the election-in 
situation. Undoubtedly, the error in drafting arose due to the imme-
diately preceding parenthetical that referred to the election-in joint and 
survivor annuity. However, following the literal language of the statute, 
and applying traditional rules of statutory construction to the facts that 
the prior House bill distinguished between participants who had begun 
to receive an annuity and those who died before the annuity starting 
date but after the earliest retirement age (but the final version on its 
surface does not so distinguish), one is led to the conclusion that the 
literal language of the statute must be followed and the appropriate 
reference for both situations is the date of the participant's death. The 
counterargument would be that the legislative history precludes only 
using a one-year of marriage requirement before the annuity starting 
date, but not a requirement solely of marriage on the annuity starting 
date. 
As indicated above, following the literal language of the statute, 
however, as to the postretirement joint and survivor annuity benefit, 
creates a host of apparently insoluble problems. For example, a plan 
might have to provide a survivor annuity where a participant is single 
at retirement (and, hence, commences benefits with an unreduced annu-
ity even if he did not elect against a joint and survivor, because it would 
not be possible to actuarially reduce his annuity during the "joint lives" 
period since there is no other life to take into consideration) and later 
marries more than one year prior to death. The alternate of making 
128 Prop. Reg. § 1.401(a)-11(e)(1). 
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a single participant elect with respect to a retirement or disability benefit 
against the joint and survivor annuity, assuming arguendo that a plan 
could require such an election or in the absence of an election could 
somehow reduce the straight-life annuity of the single participant, is not 
easy since the explanation of the effect of a joint and survivor annuity 
becomes almost impossible. Try to explain to a seventy-year-old late-
retiring widower the reduction that would occur if he married a twenty-
one-year-old bride anytime during, say, the next five years. 
A different problem is that of a participant married at his annuity 
starting date to a wife, say, two years younger, who subsequently dies; 
and he remarries a substantially younger second wife. Following the 
literal words of the statute, if the second wife is married to him through-
out the one-year period ending at the time of his death, she would be 
entitled to a survivor annuity, although in fact its value could be sub-
stantially greater than the survivor annuity to which the former wife 
would have been entitled (since the younger, second wife would have 
a longer life expectancy and would receive more annuity payments), 
and upon which the lesser reduction in the participant's joint life annuity 
was made. This problem would of course be avoided if there were 
a requirement that the spouse had been married one year at the annuity 
starting date, as was clearly the case in the House bill. 
The proposed regulation obviates these problems by permitting as 
a prerequisite for a postretirement survivor annuity that the survivor 
have been married to the deceased participant on his annuity starting 
date. 129  Note that the permitted marriage requirement is simply marriage 
on the annuity starting date and not a permitted requirement of marriage 
throughout the one-year period ending on the annuity starting date. 
The problems discussed above are readily soluble by permitting a re-
quirement of marriage at an annuity starting date and are not really 
problems arising from a potential adverse election. Consequently, the 
draftsmen's choice was a wise one. However, surviving spouses who 
are married to a retired participant one year prior to his death are bound 
to sue the plan for a survivor annuity based upon the literal language 
of the statute and classical construction according to legislative history. 
Again, remedial legislation is the only sure solution. 
Divorce and Remarriage 
The Code and the proposed and temporary regulations do not 
expressly speak to joint and survivor annuities in the context of divorce. 
However, following the literal language of the Code and the regulations 
129 Id. 
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a plan could provide that no postretirement annuity is available where 
the surviving spouse is not married to the participant throughout the 
one-year period prior to his death, and could thereby cut out a post-
retirement annuity for a divorced spouse if she were divorced one year 
or more prior to the participant's death. If the plan did this, an interest-
ing question would arise as to the effect upon the participant's now single 
life annuity. One possibility would be to reinstate for such participant 
a single life annuity retroactively, perhaps with a lump-sum distribution 
attributable to increases to the past, and an increase in monthly pay-
ments for the remainder of the participant's life. While a strong case 
may be made that the husband's payments should be increased to a 
straight life annuity from the point of one year after the divorce on, 
some plans might discount in advance for divorces similar to separa-
tions from service prior to full vesting. If this were the case, then a 
lump-sum distribution attributable to the cost for the survivor annuity 
protection during the period prior to the divorce and one year thereafter 
would not be appropriate. 
Two-Year Waiting Period 
A plan is not required to, but may, provide that any election out 
of a joint and survivor annuity with reference to the annuity starting 
date or any election into a joint and survivor annuity after the end of 
the pre-earliest retirement age period, and any revocation of any such 
election will not become effective, or will cease to be effective, if the 
participant dies within a period (not in excess of two years) beginning 
on the date of such election or revocation as the case may be; provided, 
however, that such election or revocation must be given effect in the 
case of accidental death where the accident causing death occurs after 
the election or revocation and the failure to give effect to the election 
or revocation would deprive the participant's survivor of a survivor 
annuity. 130  
The "deprivation of survivor annuity" requirement has a subtle, 
surely intentional effect. Where the plan uses the two-year rule and 
a participant elects-out of the joint and survivor annuity during the 
ninety-day period prior to an annuity starting date and dies within two 
years after such election-out, the election-out will never be given effect 
and the survivor will be entitled to a survivor annuity. If the death is 
not due to an accident, the primary rule takes effect; that is, death from 
nonaccidental causes within two years after an election renders it 
ineffective. Where the participant suffers an accidental death, failure 
130 I.R.C. § 401 (a)(11) (F); ERISA § 205(f). Prop. Reg. § 1.401 (a)-11 (f ). 
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to give effect to the election-out would not deprive the participant's 
survivor of a survivor annuity; therefore, the accidental death exception 
does not apply. Conversely, where a participant elects into a joint and 
survivor annuity and dies from accidental causes due to an accident 
occurring thereafter, the election-in can be given effect under the acci-
dental death exception. 
In a defined contribution plan or in a defined benefit plan that does 
not discount for mortality, for example, an insurance contract plan with 
a reserve death benefit, there is no possibility of adverse selection. The 
death benefit will be paid to some beneficiary in any event. Accordingly, 
such plans will be well advised to forego the permitted antiadverse 
selection provisions in favor of greater administrative simplicity. 
No Requirement of Subsidization of Joint and 
Survivor Annuity 
Actuarial Costs 
The last sentences of Code Section 40 1 (a) ( 1 1 ) (G) and of ERISA 
Section 205 (h) provide that the plan may take into account in any 
equitable fashion, as determined by Treasury regulations, 131 any in-
creased costs resulting from providing joint and survivor annuity benefits. 
However, the Title I provision limits this to any increased costs re-
sulting from an election into a joint and survivor annuity during 
the period beginning with the end of the pre-earliest retirement benefit 
period and ending on the normal retirement age, while the Title II 
provision simply speaks to any increased costs resulting from providing 
joint and survivor annuity benefits. The Conference Report states that 
plans may make reasonable actuarial adjustments to take account of 
the possibility that total costs of the plan (without any apparent limita-
tion to election-in survivor and annuity benefits) otherwise might be 
increased because of adverse selection and agreed with statements in 
the House Committee on Ways and Means Report to the effect that the 
reform legislation did not require that the plan "subsidize" the joint 
and survivor feature and these plans may make such reasonable actuarial 
adjustments. 132 The Ways and Means Committee Report, in turn, stated 
that a joint and survivor annuity could be less in terms of dollars per 
annuity payment than the single life annuity.'" Senator Williams (D-
N.J.) stated in his discussion of the Conference Report that such reason- 
131 Prop. Reg. § 1.401 (a)-11 (g). 
132 H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, at 280. 
133 H.R. Rep. No. 93-807, at 68. 
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able actuarial adjustments could be made either on an individual case-by- 
case basis, or in the aggregate, based on the plan's overall experience. 134 
 
The proposed regulations state that a "plan may take into account 
in any equitable manner consistent with generally accepted actuarial 
principles applied on a consistent basis any increased costs from provid-
ing joint and survivor annuity benefits." 135 More significantly, they also 
provide in the definition of the term "qualified joint and survivor annuity" 
that 
A qualified joint and survivor annuity must be at least the actuarial 
equivalent of the normal form of benefit offered under the plan. 
Equivalence may be determined, on the basis of consistently applied 
reasonable actuarial factors, for each participant or for all participants 
or reasonable groupings of participants if such determination does not 
result in discrimination in favor of employees who are officers, share-
holders, or highly compensated.'" 
Provisions in the regulations that any increase in cost resulting from 
providing survivor annuity benefits may be taken into account in any 
"equitable manner consistent with generally accepted actuarial principles 
applied on a consistent basis" should be read in conjunction with Pro-
posed Treasury Regulations Section 1.411 ( a)-4, which provides that 
any reduction in accrued benefits in excess of a true actuarial reduction 
constitutes a prohibited forfeiture. These two provisions set the stage 
for second-guessing by the participants and the Internal Revenue Service 
as to whether the actuarial principles used by the plan in taking account 
of the cost are generally accepted and applied on a consistent basis and 
for litigation by plan participants and beneficiaries on the ground that 
the interest and mortality assumptions used to compute the actuarially 
equivalent joint and survivor annuity are erroneous.'" 
There are at least three distinct ways in which a survivor annuity 
may add to the costs of a plan: 
(1) If the survivor annuity comes into effect at the annuity starting 
date, there may be more annuity payments made over the life of the 
participant and thereafter the life of his surviving spouse than would 
have been made over the life of the participant alone. The legislative 
history is clear that notwithstanding the wording of ERISA Section 
205(h) the participant's benefit in such circumstances may be reduced 
134 120 Cong. Rec. 515739 (daily ed., Aug. 22, 1974) (Sen. Williams). 
135 Prop. Reg. § l.401 (a) - 11 (g). 
135 Prop. Reg. § 1.401(a)-11(b)(1). 
337 See generally American Bar Association, Section of Taxation, Comments 
on Proposed Regulations Re: Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuities 14-15. 
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so that his benefit and that of his surviving spouse are the actuarial 
equivalent of a single life annuity for his life. 138 
(2) A possible additional cost is that of the survivor annuity 
protection during the years of eligibility for early retirement. In the case 
of a participant who does not elect early retirement, but does elect into 
a joint and survivor annuity and dies prior to normal retirement age, 
there can be no adjustment to the amount of his benefit alone, since he 
will have none, that would compensate for the preretirement survivor 
annuity paid to his surviving spouse. 139 Each year the participant enjoys 
this protection for his spouse may be conceptualized as enjoyment of 
a form of life insurance protection. As mentioned above, in theory this 
cost could be compensated for by directly charging the participant a 
premium for each year of such protection. It could also be compensated 
for by reducing the ultimate annuity of every participant who enjoys 
this protection and who lives to receive a retirement pension commenc-
ing at the annuity starting date. In short, just as in the payment of 
insurance premiums, all participants who elect in and survive until their 
annuity starting date will bear the cost of their preretirement survivor 
annuity protection (that cost in effect would consist largely of the cost 
of preretirement survivor annuity payments to the election-in surviving 
spouses of participants who elected-in and then died) by having the 
amount of their standard benefit reduced for that cost. The right to 
make adjustments for this purpose is clearly recognized by Section 
205(h) of ERISA as well as the Title II provision. 
Another means of charging participants for this survivor annuity 
protection would be to reduce the joint lives annuity (and, hence, sur-
vivor annuity as well) of any participant who had elected-in and then 
died prior to normal retirement age for the costs of the protection 
enjoyed up to the point that he died. A fundamental question raised 
by one commentator is whether the hypothetical joint life annuities 
(and, hence, the floor for the preretirement survivor annuity) can be 
reduced for the cost of the preretirement survivor annuity protection 
until a participant dies. 140  
Code Section 401(a) (11) (C), in setting forth the amount of the 
election-in survivor annuity, measures it with respect to the joint annuity 
to which, in the words of the statute, the participant would have been 
entitled, or, in the words of the regulations, to which the surviving 
spouse would have been entitled; but, in either case, the entitlement is 
138 H.R. Rep. No. 93-807, at 68. 
139 "Recommendations on Spouse Options, at 27,022. 
140 Stuchiner, "ERISA Joint and Survivor Annuity Requirements," 2 Pension 
& Profit-Sharing Tax J. 15, 25-26 (1975). 
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determined as if the participant had made an election-in immediately 
prior to his retirement and as if his retirement had occurred on the day 
before his death and within the period in which an election could be 
made.'" Following the Code and the proposed regulations literally, 
a participant who had not terminated service prior to his death could 
have his joint lives annuity reduced only to the extent that such benefit 
would be reduced for any participant who elected-in and survived until 
retirement, and not for his actual period of protection. This result 
appears supported by the proposed regulations that illustrate this provi-
sion by the above-quoted example in which the reduced amount under 
the qualified joint and survivor annuity (of $80 per month) is apparently 
the same "regardless of when he [the participant] makes a valid election-
[in]." 142 
On the other hand, if a plan attempted to reduce the straight life 
annuity of each participant who elected-in and survived until retirement 
for the number of years that he enjoyed the preretirement survivor 
annuity protection, under this provision the deemed joint lives annuity 
of a participant who elected in and died prior to actual retirement would 
be reduced for only a day or so of deemed survivor annuity protection, 
when in fact the participant could have enjoyed almost ten years of 
preretirement survivor annuity protection. 
In contrast, if a participant had elected-in to a survivor annuity, 
then terminated employment, and several years later but prior to normal 
retirement age died, the participant would not have been entitled to 
make an election-in on the day before his death, since he had not con-
tinued employment. This would lead to the result, carefully following 
the provisions of the proposed regulations and the statute, that the par-
ticipant would have retired on the day before his death, and, hence, the 
survivor annuity of the postretirement joint and survivor annuity (not 
the election-in preretirement survivor annuity) would apply so that the 
surviving spouse would be entitled to a postretirement survivor annuity. 
Yet, since an election-in would not have been permitted after termina-
tion of employment, there would be no reduction in the joint lives 
annuity for the predeath survivor annuity protection. There would, 
however, be permitted a reduction in the joint lives annuity for the 
survivor annuity protection after the deemed retirement on the day 
before the participant's death. 
In addition, the proposed regulations do not explicitly recognize 
directly charging the participant, for example, through payroll deduc-
tions, although in some instances this may be cheaper to him than reduc- 
141 I.R.C. § 401 (a) (11)(c); Prop. Reg. § 1.401 (a)-11(d)(3) (V). 
142 Id. 
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ing his joint lives annuity. While directly charging the electing-in par-
ticipant might be a cheaper way as to the participants of dealing with 
increased costs from election-in survivor annuities, and might in some 
circumstances be more equitable than reducing the standard benefit of 
all participants who elect-in and survive, a problem that the drafters 
of the regulations (who undoubtedly were aware of the desirability in 
some circumstances of directly charging participants) may have faced 
is that the statute only speaks to a plan taking into account any increased 
costs. It is difficult to force direct charging participants into this 
framework. 
(3) The third cost is that of adverse selection, which is discussed 
above in the context of the two-year interval between the election and 
death and the permitted requirement that the spouse must have been 
married to the participant for at least a year prior to the participant's 
death (and married at the annuity starting date). 
Administrative Costs 
Due to the requirement of a written explanation of the financial 
effect of elections-in and -out, some commentators have been concerned 
with a number of potential administrative costs and problems, such as: 
Do tables qualify as layman's language? The first is simply that if 
the plan uses tables that set forth, for example, a male employee's age 
in the left-hand margin and the wife's age across the top of the column 
(and possibly substantially identical tables would be required for female 
employees), the tables become quite complex. Moreover, such tabular 
adjustments may be difficult to communicate to rank-and-file employees. 
On the other hand, giving each individual participant the precise dollar 
amount of his own specific reduction if he takes a survivor annuity 
turning on his age and that of his spouse could be quite expensive. 143 
Unisex calculations. Coupled with the problem of the complexity 
of the table itself is the question whether different adjustments should 
be applied to male and female participants, assuming that they are the 
same age and their wives and husbands are the same ages.'" Tradition-
ally, separate mortality tables have generally been applied to men and 
women, with a male participant and his female spouse suffering a much 
sharper reduction than a female participant and her male spouse, on 
the theory that, in the aggregate, women live longer. The danger is that 
the legitimacy of such sex distinctions will be challenged. 
As Representative Chisholm pointed out in the floor debate on 
143 Id. at 27,026.  
144 Id 
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H.R. 2, while the female population lives longer than its male coun-
terpart as a whole, there is evidence that working women are dying 
at younger ages, just as male workers do. Moreover, there are very few 
tables on mortality rates of working women. In a parallel development, 
the EEOC, according to Representative Chisholm, has ruled that the 
practice of using separate tables for working men and working women 
as the basis for separate computations is inherently discriminatory. 
"For example, the EEOC ruled against TIAA-CREF—Teachers Insur-
ance Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund. TIAA did 
indeed keep separate tables for working men and working women and 
found that the projected average lifetime for men was 82 years and 
for their women was 86 years. They then made separate projections 
of benefits on the basis of these figures. EEOC ruled against them, 
however, because they found that 75% of the women workers were 
dying before the age of 86, the average date of mortality. What was 
happening was that a few women were very long-lived and they were 
dragging the average lifetime expectancy rate of the group to a higher 
level than the majority of the group actually experienced."'" Similar 
developments recently have been occurring under state law.'" Some 
commentators have questioned, however, the EEOC premise that Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 demands provision of equal benefits 
in this area.147  
As a consequence, plans may wish to adopt "unisex" tables, par-
ticularly since a subsequent change from sex-based tables to a unisex 
table might be deemed to be a violation of the ERISA requirement that 
an accrued benefit of a participant in a plan not be decreased by an 
amendment, except under certain limited conditions. 148 
 Such a unisex 
mortality table could be justified on the basis that in the aggregate the 
actuarial computations prevented any increase in costs. 
145 120 Cong. Rec. H1135 (daily ed., Feb. 28, 1974) (Rep. Chisholm). See 
also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Decision No. 74-18 (April 26, 
1974). 
146 Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power, 387 F. Supp. 
980 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 8 E.P.D. ¶ 9478 (1974); 8 E.P.D. 
¶ 9685 (1974). 
147 Note, "Sex Discrimination in Employee Fringe Benefits," 17 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 109, 130 (1975). See generally Bernstein & Williams, "Title VII 
and The Problem of Sex Classification in Pension Programs," 74 Colum. L. Rev. 
1203 (1974). 
1 48 I.R.C. § 411(b)(6); ERISA § 204(g). Compare In re Ayman, 193 
N.Y.S.2d 2 (C.A. 1959) (change in actuarial tables used to convert accumulation 
of employer contributions into annuity violated rule in state constitution against 
any diminution in benefits). 
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Furthermore, on an aggregate basis, it may be desirable to devise 
tables lumping together several age groups of participants with spouses 
a stated number of years younger, with a composite average reduction. 
For example, if the reduction where the participant is fifty-five and his 
spouse is fifty-three is 88.5 percent, and 88.1 percent where the partic-
ipant is fifty-seven and the spouse is two years younger, a plan might 
substitute 88 percent for each of these figures.'" An even simpler table 
might be to provide adjustment factors based on the age differential 
between the participant and his spouse, such as providing that if a male 
employee chooses a 50 percent survivor annuity, his benefit during their 
joint lives would be reduced by 15 percent if his wife is the same age, 
16 percent if she is one year younger, 17 percent if two years younger, 
etc.150 Such groupings or overall rules should be easier to communicate 
and be understood by the average layman. 
The proposed regulations in their approach to actuarial equivalence 
(and, hence, to the written explanation requirement) seem to accept the 
concept of using such groups which should help minimize the cost of 
communicating the financial effect of elections-in and -out to partic-
ipants.'" 
149 Examples taken from "Recommendations on Spouse Options" at 27,029-
27,030. 
150 Id. 
151 The liberal approach to "equivalence" taken in the proposed regulations, 
which clearly contemplate utilization of reasonable groupings of participants—
probably similar to that set forth in the text above—indicates that communication 
of the financial effect upon a participant's annuity may be made on the basis of 
a table with groupings in it. Presumably, the financial effect upon the participant's 
annuity in terms of dollars per annuity payment can be explained by including 
with the table monthly payments under the straight life annuity he would be 
entitled to. Then he could apply the reduction given in the table to determine 
the actual dollar reduction. 
While this approach would solve many, if not most, of the communications 
problems of defined benefit plans, there are still serious problems with defined 
contribution plans. Those plans traditionally only set forth the dollar amount 
of the participant's account. Even if you can express the reduction on the basis 
of grouping payrolls, you still have to know what monthly annuity the dollar 
accumulations will buy. This would require a defined contribution plan to obtain 
either the services of an actuary or an insurance company to supply the cost. 
Hopefully, standard annuity cost tables will be available so that the plan admin-
istrator can readily calculate an approximate amount of the monthly annuity that 
the accumulations in a particular participant's account would purchase. An analog 
may be found in the annuity tables contained in Estate Tax Reg. § 20.2031-10(f). 
See also Rev. Rul. 72-438, 1972-2 C.B. 38. These tables do not contain commer-
cial annuity rates, but could be used to present the approximate amount of benefits. 
From that, it would be simple to work back with standard tables to the reduction 
on the participant's life annuity if other features, such as the survivor annuity or 
a ten-year certain annuity, are used. 
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Consequences of Failure to Provide Joint and Survivor Annuity 
Under Title II of ERISA, the failure of a plan to provide a qualified 
joint and survivor annuity in circumstances where such an annuity is 
theoretically required, results in disqualification of the trust, thereby 
affecting the deductibility of contributions to the plan, 152 the taxation 
of income earned by the trust,'" and the taxation to participants of their 
accrued vested benefit.'" Under Title I of ERISA, the legislative man-
date is that the plan must provide for an annuity benefit in a form 
having the effect of a qualified joint and survivor annuity where appli-
cable. The consequence of a failure to do so under that title is that 
a participant, beneficiary, fiduciary, or the Secretary of Labor may bring 
an action to enjoin any act or practice, that is, failure to pay a survivor 
benefit that violates this provision of ERISA, or to obtain other appro-
priate equitable relief to redress such violation or to enforce this section 
of ERISA. 155 
 For example, it might be possible for a proper party to 
bring an action to mandate an amendment of a plan to provide a qual-
ified joint and survivor annuity where required. In all likelihood, such 
an action would be brought rather than the plan disqualified by the Sec-
retary of Treasury, so that the cost of providing an unanticipated survivor 
annuity will constitute the true penalty and deterrent. 
Application and Effective Date 
ERISA Section 1021 (a) (1) provides that Code Section 401(a) 
(11) is applicable to plan years beginning after December 31, 1975 as 
to plans in existence on January 1, 1974. The mandatory joint and 
survivor provisions apply as to a participant only if his annuity starting 
date occurs after such date, and they do not apply even then unless the 
participant was an "active participant" in the plan on or after the effec-
tive date. The proposed Treasury regulations define the term "active 
participant" as a participant for whom (1) benefits are being accrued 
under the plan; (2) his employer is obligated to contribute under the 
plan; or (3) the employer would have been obligated to contribute un-
der the plan had any contributions been made under the plan. 156 The 
import of the exclusion of participants who are not active is that the 
152 I.R.C. § 404(a) (5). 
153 I.R.C. § 501 (a). 
154 I.R.C. § 402(b). 
155 ERISA § 502. See generally Lee, "The Elaborate Interweaving of Juris-
diction: Labor and Tax Administration and Enforcement of ERISA and Beyond," 
10 U. Richmond L. Rev. 463, 481-485 (1976). I.R.C. § 401(a) (11)(E); ERISA 
§ 205 (e). 
155 Prop. Reg. § 1.401 (a)-11 (h). 
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standard joint and survivor benefit provision is not required as to a 
withdrawn participant with a deferred vested account upon the annuity 
starting date of his deferred vested benefit. 
The joint and survivor annuity requirements apply only to plans 
to which the vesting requirements of ERISA are applicable. Thus, they 
do not apply to government plans or church plans (unless the latter elect 
into ERISA). 
Proposals for the Future 
Treasury regulations or, perhaps more likely, IRS rulings could 
ease the drafting and administrative problems of the joint and survivor 
annuity provisions as applied to defined contribution plans by stating 
that such plans can provide a death benefit (even in the form of a sur-
vivor annuity) in excess of the 100 percent of joint lives ceiling of the 
qualified joint and survivor annuity (subject, of course, to the traditional 
incidental benefits test), but that only the amount of the death benefit 
or survivor annuity not in excess of the 100 percent of joint lives annuity 
ceiling would be considered a qualified joint and survivor annuity. This 
would ease the drafting problems and, for that matter, the explanation 
of the survivor benefits in the summary plan description, where a defined 
contribution plan provides for payment of the account balance or account 
balance plus insurance proceeds as a vested death benefit, and the plan 
designer wishes to eleminate the necessity of an election-out. 
The actuarial and administrative cost problems of defined contribu-
tion plans as well would be eased considerably if the Service were to 
publish a standard table providing the amount of a straight life annuity 
at a given age at normal or early retirement that an account balance 
would purchase or provide per $100 or $1,000. Here, the plan admin-
istrator probably should make the mathematical computations based 
upon the table necessary to determine the monthly straight life annuity 
that the account balance at a given age would provide or purchase. The 
explanation to the employee by the plan administrator could then provide 
the dollar amount of the participant's account balance and his approx-
imate monthly annuity (with a caveat perhaps that an actual annuity 
purchased from an insurance company might vary from that provided 
in the explanation). In addition, the Revenue Service should publish 
standard tables with groupings of lives (perhaps on a unisex basis) set-
ting forth the percentage reduction of a joint lives or straight life annuity 
where the participant had attained a given age and his spouse is a stated 
number of years younger. The plan administrator should then be per-
mitted to give this table to the participant for him to go down the table 
and find his age and that of his spouse, figure the percentage reduction 
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of his monthly annuity based upon such ages, and apply such percentage 
reduction to the monthly annuity provided in the explanation given to 
him by the plan administrator (based on the other government table for 
conversion of account balances to monthly annuities) to find out the 
dollars and cents effect on his joint lives annuity of a survivor annuity. 
Only with early steps by the IRS in publishing such tables or with early 
announcement that it will provide or at least accept such tables, can 
plan designers in uninsured defined contribution plans (at least in plans 
with a lesser number of participants) safely provide for a life annuity 
payout provision. 
As to defined benefit plans that wish to provide a death benefit 
equal to the reserve, or the reserve plus insurance proceeds in some cir-
cumstances, essentially the same approach of splitting a preretirement 
survivor annuity into a qualified survivor annuity and excess survivor 
annuity could be taken. Recalling that the reason for the 100 percent 
of joint lives annuity ceiling in the definition of the survivor annuity 
component of a qualified joint and survivor annuity was ostensibly to 
backstop new Code Section 415 (as applied to defined benefit plans), 
it is important to note that Code Section 415(b) (2) (B) disregards only 
"that portion of any joint and survivor annuity which constitutes a 
qualified joint and survivor annuity. . . ." Accordingly, a defined benefit 
plan should be able to fund a preretirement survivor annuity to the 
maximum amount allowable under the traditional incidental benefit test, 
but only the qualified or 100 percent of joint lives ceiling portion would 
constitute a qualified joint and survivor annuity. The amount of the 
survivor annuity in excess then would be part of the "annual benefit' 
taken into account under the new Code Section 415 benefit limitation 
on defined benefit plans.'" A Service ruling or Treasury modification 
of the proposed regulations could, for instance, provide that "qualified 
joint and survivor annuity" means an annuity for the life of the par- 
157 Rev. Rul. 75-481, 1975-44 I.R.B. 9, provides that in the case of a defined 
benefit plan that provides retirement benefits other than in the form of either a 
straight life annuity or qualified joint and survivor annuity, the annual benefit will 
be adjusted to the actuarial equivalent benefit in the form of a straight life annuity. 
The revenue ruling goes on to provide that in making such actuarial adjustments, 
any ancillary benefit "which is not directly related to retirement income benefits 
(such as preretirement death benefits) shall not be taken into account." Under 
a narrow reading, a survivor annuity in excess of a qualified survivor annuity 
would be excluded from the ancillary benefits rule. What we may expect, however, 
is to see defined contribution plans, particularly insured plans, provide a survivor 
annuity equal to the 100 percent or perhaps 50 percent of joint lives annuity, 
with an optional preretirement death benefit of a substantially greater amount, 
such as insurance proceeds of 100 times the monthly benefit and the amount of 
the reserve, which the widow may elect instead. 
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ticipant and the portion of a survivor annuity for the life of his spouse 
which is neither (1) less than one-half of, nor (2) greater than, the 
amount of the annuity payable during the joint lives of the participant 
and his spouse. 
In any statutory revision of the joint and survivor annuity provi-
sions, as an alternative to the present provision which only awkwardly 
fits defined contribution plans, Congress should consider splitting the 
joint and survivor annuity provisions into two parts: one applicable to 
defined contribution plans, and the other to defined benefit plans. A 
defined contribution plan providing full vesting upon death and payment 
of the account balance to a beneficiary of the participant does not, as 
Congress apparently believed was the case with defined benefit plans, 
convert the plan into an insurance program. In a defined benefit plan, 
the retirement benefits are fixed or are definitely determinable by a plan 
formula. To require a benefit that was not previously in the plan would 
cause an increase in the funding each year necessary to provide the 
defined benefit under the plan. Conversely, in a defined contribution 
plan, contributions are determined without reference to the amount of 
the benefits that will be available on retirement, and the plan benefit is 
simply the account balance. Historically, such plans provided for im-
mediate vesting upon the death of an active participant or a terminated 
participant. Thus, a forfeiture upon the death of either an active or 
terminated participant constitutes an unwarranted windfall to the other 
participants where forfeitures are added to their account balances, or to 
the employer if forfeitures reduce future employer contributions. Since 
there is no cost factor precluding payment of a death benefit equal to 
the account balance, it is inconsistent with the premise that contributions 
to the plan are in lieu of current compensation not to require a defined 
contribution plan to immediately vest a participant's account balance 
upon his death and pay it to his beneficiary regardless of whether he has 
terminated service. Accordingly, Congress should amend the joint and 
survivor annuity provisions as applied to defined contribution plans to 
provide that the preretirement account balance in such plans must be 
fully vested upon the death of a participant (including a terminated 
participant with a deferred vested account) and payable to the partici-
pant's surviving spouse through the purchase of a survivor annuity, unless 
she elects otherwise. Such a survivor annuity is administratively feasible 
if Congress also requires the Internal Revenue Service to promulgate 
standard tables for conversion of account balances into annuity amounts. 
Furthermore, the statute as amended could provide that a participant 
could elect—perhaps only with the consent of his surviving spouse—
that someone other than his spouse be the beneficiary of his account. 
Such amendments would obviate an expensive preretirement election-in 
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explanation and the 100 percent of joint lives annuity survivor annuity 
ceiling problems. 
As to postretirement survivor annuities for defined contribution 
plans: The existing retirement joint and survivor annuity approach 
could be maintained without substantial administrative difficulties. At 
the same time, the apparent congressional desire to encourage annuity 
payouts at retirement could be met, so long as the statute also required 
the Revenue Service to promulgate tables (in addition to those from 
which the monthly annuity can be calculated) that would set forth 
groupings of ages for participants and surviving spouses from which the 
percentage deduction of a straight life annuity with a 50 percent, or 
perhaps 75 percent, of joint lives and survivor annuity could be calcu-
lated if the participant were a given age and the surviving spouse were 
several years younger. It might be advisable to mandate that these 
tables be compiled on a unisex basis. And, Congress should explicitly 
permit in the statute that an explanation of election-out effects could be 
satisfied through use of such tables, at least in defined contribution plans. 
As to any revision of the application of the joint and survivor 
annuity provisions to defined benefits plans, a more radical question must 
be asked. Was Congress correct in viewing a survivor annuity as a form 
of insurance and, therefore, in order to lessen cost factors to the plan in 
provision of a survivor annuity, in limiting commencement of the elec-
tion-in preretirement survivor annuity to the earliest retirement age of a 
participant? 
In broad outline, ERISA was designed in this context to assure that 
participants in retirement plans not lose their benefits as a result of 
unduly restrictive forfeiture provisions or the failure of the plan to ac-
cumulate and retain sufficient funds to meet its obligations.' Congress 
thought vesting necessary for participants to actually benefit from retire-
ment plans.'" Additionally, funding or accumulating sufficient assets to 
pay benefits in the future to the participants in defined benefit plans is 
required under ERISA in accordance with a contribution schedule that 
Congress contemplated would produce sufficient funds to meet the 
obligations of defined benefit plans as they fall due.'" Such an adequate 
contribution or minimum funding schedule was viewed as necessary not 
only to protect the rights of participants under the plan, but also to pro-
vide a systematic method for employers to pay their plan costs."' How-
ever, when such a minimum contribution schedule has not been in effect 
158 H.R. Rep. No. 93-807, at 11-12. 
159 /d. at 53. 
160 See id. at 24. 
161 S. Rep. No. 93-383, at 22. 
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for a sufficiently long period and the plan suffers adverse investment 
experience or, in some instances, benefit levels are increased, there still 
may not be sufficient assets in a defined benefit plan for payment of the 
plan's obligations when they fall due. 162 Accordingly, Congress also 
created the mechanism of insuring a minimal level of benefits in certain 
defined benefit plans through the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora-
tion.'" Where any of these provisions might add to the cost of financing 
retirement plans, Congress sought to adopt provisions that struck a bal-
ance between providing meaningful reform and keeping costs within 
reasonable limits.164 At the same time, all of these reforms and others 
are meaningless to a participant or, perhaps better, to his surviving 
spouse, if he dies prior to retirement in circumstances in which a survivor 
annuity is not available. 
The theme running throughout the floor debate, the committee 
reports, and other legislative history of ERISA, of striking a balance 
between providing meaningful reform and keeping costs within reason-
able limits can be better understood when it is realized that as elements 
of the plan design (such as, degree of vesting, when accrual of benefits 
commences, when predeath benefits are to be provided, or how fast past 
service liabilities are to be amortized) are made more favorable to par-
ticipants, the cost of funding a defined benefit plan increases.'" In the 
genesis of ERISA, some espoused the view that employee representatives 
and employers had already negotiated a trade-off between level of bene-
fits and factors such as vesting, preretirement benefits, and entry age for 
accrual purposes. 166 For Congress to then step in was to shift the balance 
that the parties had already struck.'" Indeed, it is probably a fact of 
life that in most negotiated bilateral defined benefit plans any increase 
in the cost of vesting or, say, preretirement benefits will not result in a 
decrease in benefit levels—only in an increase in employer costs.'" 
162 H.R. Rep. No. 93-807, at 13. 
163 ERISA §§ 4021 and 4022. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
Reg. §§ 2605.3 through 2605.6, and 2609.3 through 2609.8. 
164 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 93-807, at 19. 
165 See, e.g.,   Hearings on H.R. 2 and H.R. 462 before the General Subcomm. 
on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 328 
(1973) (Jacob Sheinkman, General Secretary-Treasurer, Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers) (hereinafter cited as H.R. 2 Hearings). 
166 Hearings on S. 4, S. 1179, and S. 1631 before the Subcomm. on Private 
Pension Plans of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 341 (1973) 
(Secretary of the Treasury Shultz) (hereinafter cited as Senate Finance Hearings); 
H.R. 2 Hearings at 388-389 (Rep. Erlenborn). 
167 H.R. 2 Hearings at 421 (Rep. Erlenborn). 
168 See id. at 334-335, 337 (Sheinkman). 
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As to survivor annuity provisions, however, Congress decided to 
allow, plans to pass on the costs of preretirement death benefits and post-
retirement death benefits to the participants through adjusting their 
straight life benefits. On the other hand, if we view retirement benefits 
as being in lieu of compensation and earned by the individual participant 
and not by the group of participants as a whole, the only equitable 
approach to survivor benefits would be to provide a participant with a 
death benefit at least equivalent to his vested accrued benefit at the time 
of his death, unless he otherwise elects. Thus, a participant who died 
prior to normal retirement age should be in no worse position than a 
participant who quit and had a deferred vested benefit payable at normal 
retirement age (and survived until that time). The difficulty is that as 
the right to a survivor annuity attaches at a point earlier than earliest 
retirement age; in many instances, the number of employees who elect 
not to take a preretirement survivor annuity will not be sufficient to con-
stitute a group of lives large enough to offset the increased costs for 
those participants who do die without an election-out prior to retirement 
age. On the surface, a simple answer would be to require a preretirement 
survivor annuity equal to the vested accrued benefit and permit plans to 
adjust all straight life benefits down without giving rise to a partial 
termination169 and creating a special exception to the retroactive decrease 
of benefits rule to permit such a modification of the benefit level.'" As 
a practical matter, however, it probably would be impossible for plan 
sponsors to reduce unilaterally the straight life annuity in the plan and 
certainly would not appear feasible in a multi-employer plan. An alter-
native would be to phase in any requirement that a defined benefit plan 
provide a survivor annuity equal to the reserve for the accrued benefit. 
With a phase-in, the increased costs arising from the preretirement death 
benefit could be offset by a plan not making the increases in benefits 
that would otherwise have been made in order to take account of infla-
tion and other factors during the phase-in period. Then, after the end 
of the phase-in period, defined benefit plans would be precluded from 
discounting in advance of preretirement mortality in actuarial calcula-
tions. In effect, at that point, a preretirement death benefit would be 
subsidized by the employer, although in fact it might be borne by the 
employees through decreased benefit levels. 
In a sense, this article advocates that Congress should police in 
this area those defined benefit plans that have promised more than they 
could actually deliver to all participants and then attempted to fulfill that 
promise by imposing such conditions that meaningful participation was 
169 Prop. Reg. § 1.411(d)-2(b). 
170 I.R.C. § 412(c)(a); ERISA § 302(c)(8).  
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precluded. It is submitted that if there is only a limited, amount of pen-
sion dollars,' then it is more equitable for the plan's defined benefit to 
be reduced and spread among more participants and their beneficiaries 
than to give a higher benefit to the gifted few who survive the vesting 
and the mortality risks to reach normal retirement or at least earliest 
retirement age while still employed by the company. Otherwise, a de-
fined benefit pension all too frequently will be no more than a "gamble 
on survival." 
Conclusion 
The story, possibly apocryphal, is told by one of the former com-
mittee staff members who participated in the drafting of ERISA (and 
who is now engaged in administration of that statute) that no one now 
171 In the hearings on S. 4, S. 1179, and S. 1631, then Secretary of the Trea-
sury Shultz articulated the position that in collective bargaining union and manage-
ment had agreed upon how much money per payroll dollar (i.e., the pension dol-
lar) that the employer was going to put into the plan. And then in plan design the 
parties agreed on what features, such as vesting vs. level of benefits, to allocate 
that money to. 
"You say this as though either we or you can wave a magic wand over the 
American economy and make a change in these plans without affecting the 
costs. What I am trying to point out is that all around the country unions 
and managements have sat down with each other and they have constructed 
private plans and they have said that we are going to put 10 cents an hour 
into our pension plan. Now, that is part of their bargaining. Now and then 
they have said to each other, 'how are we going to spend that 10 cents an 
hour? We could spend it all on vesting if we wanted to or we could say we 
want to raise the benefits so those who work here until they are on retirement 
will get, at least, some amount which we think added to social security is what 
is needed to get along, and so we will spend our dime that way.' 
"And so different plans have made different compromises on that. What we 
are talking about here is, and whatever vesting requirement that is put in, is 
the imposition of a Federal governmental judgment overlaying all of this 
visualized judgment which has been made the right way? We think that no 
matter how you want to spend that dime that you have to spend a portion 
of it at least for this amount of vesting. Now, to go back and retroactively 
second-guess all of the decisions, I think that is taking quite a step." 
Senate Finance Hearings at 345. 
The negotiation argument was criticized by some who said that the union 
negotiators had failed to adequately represent employee participants due to con-
flicts of interest; that is, the negotiators because of their long service were among 
the chief beneficiaries of a slow-vesting higher-benefit system and, in bargaining 
for high, but perhaps illusory, benefits, they could win more reelections and could 
frighten dissidents with the argument that a change in bargaining representatives 
might mean a loss of their pensions. See H.R. 2 Hearings at 251 (Ralph Nader 
on behalf of Public Interest Research Group). See also Senate Finance Hearings 
at 341 (Senator Long). 
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acknowledges being in the room during the drafting session that gave 
birth to the Conference Committee joint and survivor annuity provi-
sions. 172 If true, these provisions well illustrate the limitations of par-
thenogenesis. For the statute contains an unacceptable number of tech-
nical omissions and errors as well as an astounding host of ambiguities 
and, in one instance, a conflict between Titles I and II. Ready examples 
of the former are the absence of a permitted requirement of marriage to 
the surviving spouse at the annuity starting date and the amount of the 
floor of the election-in survivor annuity (assuming that the proposed 
regulations embodied the congressional intent). Perhaps the category 
of errors also includes the statutory provision as to allowable adjustments 
to the election-in survivor annuity due to the deemed election-in on the 
day before death in the context of terminated participants. Ambiguities 
are illustrated by the continued employment requirement for an election-
in survivor annuity and the ceiling, if any, on an election-in preretirement 
survivor annuity. 
The proposed regulations, on the other hand, perform an admirable 
job on the whole in attempting to paper over the lacunae in the statute 
and particularly in endeavoring to ease plan administration of the joint 
and survivor annuity provisions, such as the two-step notice provisions 
and the relieving of plans from election-in and -out requirements where 
a survivor annuity is the only form of a benefit. Where the proposed 
regulations strong-arm the statute, hopefully they will be upheld, if for 
no other reason than to stem the tide of horribles that would otherwise 
inundate plan designers and administrators. But perhaps overshadowing 
both the strengths and the minor ambiguities of the proposed regulations, 
is the fact that they (due to the underlying statute) fail utterly to take 
into account the problems arising in the application of the joint and 
survivor provisions to defined contribution plans. Such failure must be 
remedied if life annuities are to be a part of defined contribution plans, 
and suggestions are offered in this article. In addition, when (hopefully, 
not if) Congress returns to the joint and survivor annuity provisions, as 
it must to backstop the proposed regulations, it may be advisable for its 
members to rethink the premises of the joint and survivor annuity provi-
sions as applied to defined benefit plans as well. 
172 Still another former staff member claims he was in the room alone. All 
the other members were at a working lunch drafting the joint and survivor 
annuity provision. They crafted a perfect, workable provision, so the story goes, 
but the waiter dropped a plate of spaghetti on the draft and by error the spaghetti 
was enacted. The kernel of truth to both these tales, the writer is told, is that the 
final joint and survivor annuity provision was drafted by the conferees and not 
their staff. 
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Appendix A 
Section 1021(a) of Public Law 93-406 (ERISA) and H.R. Rep. 
No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 279-280 (1974). 
SEC. 1021. ADDITIONAL PLAN REQUIREMENTS. 
(a) JOINT AND SURVIVOR ANNUITY REQUIREMENT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Effective with respect to plan years beginning 
after December 31, 1975, section 401 (a) (relating to requirements for 
qualification) is amended by inserting after paragraph (10) the follow-
ing new paragraph: 
"(11) (A) A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this 
section if the plan of which such trust is a part provides for the payment 
of benefits in the form of an annuity unless such plan provides for the 
payment of annuity benefits in a form having the effect of a qualified 
joint survivor annuity. 
"(B) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (A), in the 
case of a plan which provides for the payment of benefits before the 
normal retirement age (as defined in section 411 (a) (8), the plan is 
not required to provide for the payment of annuity benefits in a form 
having the effect of a qualified joint and survivor annuity during the 
period beginning on the date on which the employee enters into the plan 
as a participant and ending on the later of- 
"(i) the date the employee reaches the earliest retirement age 
under the plan, or 
"(ii) the first day of the 120th month beginning before the 
date on which the employee reaches normal retirement age. 
"(C) A plan described in subparagraph (B) does not meet the 
requirements of subparagraph (A) unless, under the plan, a participant 
has a reasonable period during which he may elect the qualified joint 
and survivor annuity form with respect to the period beginning on the 
date on which the period described in subparagraph (B) ends and end-
ing on the date on which he reaches normal retirement age (as defined 
in section 411 (a) (8) ) if he continues his employment during that 
period. A plan does not meet the requirements of this subparagraph 
unless, in the case of such an election, the payments under the survivor 
annuity are not less than the payments which would have been made 
under the joint annuity to which the participant would have been entitled 
if he made an election described in this subparagraph immediately prior 
to his retirement and if his retirement had occurred on the day before his 
death and within the period within which an election can be made. 
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"(D) A plan shall not be treated as not satisfying the requirements 
of this paragraph solely because the spouse of the participant is not en-
titled to receive a survivor annuity (whether or not an election described 
in subparagraph (C) has been made under subparagraph (C) ) unless 
the participant and his spouse have been married throughout the 1-year 
period ending on the date of such participant's death. 
"(E) A plan shall not be treated as satisfying the requirements 
of this paragraph unless, under the plan, each participant has a reason-
able period (as described by the Secretary or his delegate by regulations) 
before the annuity starting date during which he may elect in writing 
(after having received a written explanation of the terms and conditions 
of the joint and survivor annuity and the effect of an election under this 
subparagraph) not to take such joint and survivor annuity. 
"(F) A plan shall not be treated as not satisfying the requirements 
of this paragraph solely because under the plan there is a provision that 
any election described in subparagraph (C) or (E), and any revoca-
tion of any such election, does not become effective (or ceases to be 
effective) if the participant dies within a period (not in excess of 2 years) 
beginning on the date of such election or revocation, as the case may be. 
The preceding sentence does not apply unless the plan provision de-
scribed in the preceding sentence also provides that such an election or 
revocation will be given effect in any case in which- 
"(i) the participant dies from accidental causes, 
"(ii) a failure to give effect to the election or revocation 
would deprive the participant's survivor of a survivor annuity, and 
"(iii) Such election or revocation is made before such acci-
dent occurred. 
"(G) For purposes of this paragraph- 
"(i) the term 'annuity starting date' means the first day of 
the first period for which an amount is received as an annuity 
(whether by reason of retirement or by reason of disability), 
"(ii) the term 'earliest retirement age' means the earliest date 
on which, under the plan, the participant could elect to receive 
retirement benefits, and 
"(iii) the term 'qualified joint and survivor annuity' means 
an annuity for the life of the participant with a survivor annuity 
for the life of his spouse which is not less than one-half of, or greater 
than, the amount of the annuity payable during the joint lives of 
the participant and his spouse and which is the actuarial equivalent 
of a single life annuity for the life of the participant. 
For purposes of this paragraph, a plan may take into account in any 
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equitable manner (as determined by the Secretary or his delegate) any 
increased costs resulting from providing joint and survivor annuity 
benefits. 
"(II) This paragraph shall apply only if- 
"(i) the annuity starting date did not occur before the effec-
tive date of this paragraph, and 
"(ii) the participant was an active participant in the plan on 
or after such effective date." 
Joint and survivor annuities 
Under the conference substitute, when a plan provides for a retire-
ment benefit in the form of an annuity, and the participant has been 
married for the one-year period ending on the annuity starting date, the 
plan must provide for a joint and survivor annuity. The survivor annuity 
must be not less than half of the annuity payable to the participant 
during the joint lives of the participant and his spouse. 
In the case of an employee who retires, or who attains the normal 
retirement age, the joint and survivor provision is to apply unless the 
employee elected otherwise. 
In the case of an employee who is eligible to retire prior to the 
normal retirement age under the plan, and who does not retire, the joint 
and survivor provisions need not be applicable under the plan, unless 
the employee made an affirmative election. Moreover, the plan need not 
make this option available until the employee is within 10 years of nor-
mal retirement age. (Of course, a plan may provide that a joint and 
survivor annuity is to be the only form of benefit payable under the 
plan, and in this case, no election need be provided.) 
These rules should help to avoid the situation where an employee 
who had not yet retired might have his own retirement benefit reduced 
as a result of inaction on his part and should also help to prevent adverse 
selection as against the plan. 
The employee is to be afforded a reasonable opportunity, in ac-
cordance with regulations, to exercise his election out of, (or, before 
normal retirement age, possibly into) the joint and survivor provision 
before the annuity starting date (or before he becomes eligible for early 
retirement). The employee is to be supplied with a written explanation 
of the joint and survivor provision, explained in layman's language, as 
well as the practical (dollar and cents) effect on him (and his or her 
spouse) of making an election either to take or not to take the provision. 
At the same time, regulations in this area should take cognizance of the 
practical difficulties which certain industries (particularly those having 
multiemployer plans) may have in contacting all of their participants. 
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To prevent adverse selection the plan may provide that any election, 
or revocation of an election, is not to become effective if the participant 
dies within some period of time (not in excess of two years) of the 
election or revocation (except in the case of accidental death where the 
accident which causes death occurs after the election). 
Also, the conferees agree with the statements in the Ways and 
Means Committee report (No. 93-807) to the effect that the bill does 
not require the plan to "subsidize" the joint and survivor feature (al-
though the plan is permitted to do so) and that plans may make reason-
able actuarial adjustments to take account of the possibility that total 
costs of the plan otherwise might be increased because of adverse 
selection. 
Appendix B 
Section 1021 of H.R.2, as passed by the House (Feb. 28, 1974) 
and H.R. Rep. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 67-68 (1974). 
SEC. 1021. ADDITIONAL PLAN REQUIREMENTS. 
(a) JOINT AND SURVIVOR ANNUITY REQUIREMENT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 401(a) (relating to requirements for 
qualification) is amended by inserting after paragraph (10) the follow-
ing new paragraph: 
"(11) (A) A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this 
section if the plan of which such trust is a part provides for the payment 
of benefits in the form of an annuity and if- 
"(i) the participant and his spouse have been married 
throughout the 5-year period ending on the annuity starting date, or 
"(ii) the participant dies after his earliest retirement age and 
before the annuity starting date, and the participant and his spouse 
have been married throughout the 5-year period ending on the date 
of his death, 
unless such plan provides for the payment of annuity benefits in a form 
having the effect of a qualified joint and survivor annuity. 
"(B) A plan shall be treated as satisfying the requirements of this 
paragraph if, under the plan, each participant has a reasonable period 
(as prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate by regulations) before 
the annuity starting date during which he may elect in writing (after 
having received a written explanation of the terms and conditions of 
the joint and survivor annuity and the effect of an election under this 
subparagraph) not to take such joint and survivor annuity. 
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"(C) A plan shall not be treated as not satisfying the requirements 
of this paragraph merely because, under the plan, any election under 
subparagraph (B), and any revocation of any such election, does not 
become effective (or ceases to be effective) if the participant dies within 
a period (not in excess of 2 years) beginning on the date of such election 
or revocation, as the case may be. 
"(D) For purposes of this paragraph- 
"(i) the term 'annuity starting date' means the first day of 
the first period for which an amount is received as an annuity 
(whether by reason of retirement or by reason of disability), 
"(ii) the term 'earliest retirement age' means the earliest date 
on which, under the plan, the participant could elect to receive 
retirement benefits, and 
"(iii) the term 'qualified joint and survivor annuity' means 
an annuity for the life of the participant with a survivor annuity for 
the life of his spouse which is not contingent upon survivorship 
of such spouse beyond the earliest age at which the participant 
could elect to receive retirement benefits under the plan and which 
is not less than one-half of the amount of the annuity payable dur-
ing the joint lives of the participant and his spouse. 
"(E) This paragraph shall apply only if- 
"(i) the annuity starting date did not occur before the effec-
tive date of this paragraph, and 
"(ii) the participant was an active participant in the plan on 
or after such effective date." 
(2) CERTAIN ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS APPLY ONLY TO PLANS 
TO WHICH VESTING REQUIREMENTS APPLY.—Section 401 (a) (relating 
to requirements for qualification) is amended by adding at the end 
thereof the following new sentences: "Paragraphs (11), (12), (13), 
(14), (15), and (19) shall apply only in the case of a plan to which 
section 411 (relating to minimum vesting standards) applies. Any 
regulation prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate for purposes of 
paragraph (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), or (19) shall be effective 
for any plan year beginning after December 31, 1975, only if approved 
by the Secretary of Labor." 
(b) REQUIREMENTS IN CASE OF MERGERS AND CONSOLIDATIONS 
OF PLANS OR TRANSFERS OF PLAN ASSETS.—Section 401(a) is amended 
by inserting after paragraph (11) the following new paragraph: 
"(12) A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this 
section unless the plan of which such trust is a part provides that- 
JOINT AND SURVIVOR ANNUITIES UNDER ERISA 
	 313 
"(A) in the case of any merger or consolidation with, 
or transfer of assets or liabilities to, any other plan after Oc-
tober 22, 1973, each participant in the plan would (if the 
plan then terminated) receive a benefit immediately after the 
merger, consolidation, or transfer which is equal to or greater 
than the benefit he would have been entitled to receive im-
mediately before the merger, consolidation, or transfer (if the 
plan had then been terminated); and 
"(B) no merger, consolidation, or transfer of assets or 
liabilities to another plan may be made after the date of the 
enactment of this paragraph unless the plan administrator has 
filed with the Secretary or his delegate, at least 30 days before 
such merger, consolidation, or transfer, an actuarial statement 
of valuation evidencing compliance with the requirements of 
subparagraph (A)." 
(C) RETIREMENT BENEFITS MAY NOT BE ASSIGNED OR ALIEN- 
ATED.—Section 401 (a) is amended by inserting after paragraph (12) 
the following new paragraph: 
"(13) A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this 
section unless the plan of which such trust is a part provides that 
benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated. 
For purposes of the preceding sentence, there shall not be taken 
into account any voluntary and revocable assignment of not to 
exceed 10 percent of any benefit payment." 
(d) REQUIREMENT THAT PAYMENT OF BENEFITS BEGIN NOT 
LATER THAN WHEN THE PARTICIPANT ATTAINS AGE 65 OR HAS COM-
PLETED 10 YEARS OF PARTICIPATION.—Section 401(a) is amended by 
inserting after paragraph (13) the following new paragraph: 
"(14) A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this 
section unless the plan of which such trust is part provides that, 
unless the participant otherwise elects, the payment of benefits 
under the plan to the participant will begin not later than the 60th 
day after the latest of the close of the plan year in which— 
"(A) the date on which the participant attains age 65. 
"(B) occurs the 10th anniversary of the year in which 
the participant commenced participation in the plan, or 
"(C) the participant terminates his service with the em-
ployer." 
(e) REQUIREMENT THAT PLAN BENEFITS ARE NOT DECREASED 
BY CERTAIN SOCIAL SECURITY INCREASES.—Section 401(a) is amended 
by inserting after paragraph (14) the following new paragraph: 
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"(15) a trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this 
section unless under the plan of which such trust is a part— 
"(A) in the case of a participant or beneficiary who is 
receiving benefits under such plan, or 
"(B) in the case of a participant who is separated from 
the service and who has nonforfeitable rights to benefits. . . ." 
Joint and survivor annuities.—Under present law, there is no re-
quirement that a qualified employee plan must provide for survivor an-
nuities. This can result in a hardship where an individual primarily 
dependent on his pension as a source of retirement income is unable to 
make adequate provision for his spouse's retirement years should he 
predecease her. To correct this situation, the committee's bill requires 
that if a plan provides for a lifetime annuity then, where the participant 
has been married for the 5-year period ending on the annuity starting 
date, the plan must provide for a joint and survivor annuity (or an ar-
rangement, such as supplementary benefits for the participant's spouse, 
which has essentially the same effect) where the survivor annuity is at 
least half of the annuity payable to the participant during the joint lives 
of the participant and his spouse. 
The plan is not required to provide this benefit unless the employee 
has been married throughout the 5-year period ending on the annuity 
starting date. This has been done so that plans can provide reasonable 
protection against adverse selection such as might occur, for example, 
where a single person "marries" immediately before retirement, retires, 
and then chooses to take heavily subsidized joint and survivor benefits 
in the form of a lump-sum distribution. Although your committee's bill 
does not require joint and survivor benefits to be subsidized (i.e., to be 
in excess of the actuarial value of a single-life annuity), neither does 
your committee wish to provide a disincentive to such subsidized benefits. 
In addition, concern was expressed that if an employee could pro-
vide such protection for his spouse only if he had already retired, then 
this would provide an unwarranted artificial incentive to exercise early 
retirement rights where available. Your committee concluded that it was 
preferable not to provide an artificial stimulus to exercise of these rights 
(or an added cost to the providing of these rights) of the sort that would 
result from requiring a survivor annuity to be paid only when the basic 
annuity was already in pay status. As a result, the bill requires the sur-
vivor annuity to be payable if the participant after reaching the earliest 
age at which retirement is permitted (whether or not retired), where the 
participant and his spouse have been married throughout the 5-year 
period ending on the date of the participant's death. This is to be applied 
on a person-by-person basis. Thus, if a plan permits retirement as early 
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as age 50 with 30 years of service, but otherwise retirement benefits are 
to be payable only upon attaining age 65, the earliest retirement age for 
an employee who began work at 25 would be age 55. 
The plan may provide that the participant has a reasonable period 
(as prescribed in regulations) before the annuity starting date during 
which he may elect in writing—after having received a written expla-
nation of the terms and conditions of the joint and survivor annuity 
and the effect of such an election—not to take the joint and survivor 
annuity. The bill permits a plan to protect against adverse selection by 
providing that any election to take a single-life annuity (instead of a 
joint and survivor annuity) or any revocation of such an election would 
not become effective if the participant dies within some period of time 
(not in excess of 2 years) of such election or revocation. The plan would 
be permitted in such a case to disregard the election or revocation. This 
formulation of the bill's requirements provides flexibility in that it does 
not require the plan to provide any such rule as to delayed effect if those 
in control of the plan choose not to do so. The bill does not require the 
plan to "subsidize" the joint and survivor annuity. Consequently, such a 
joint and survivor annuity could be less (in terms of dollars per annuity 
payment) than the single life annuity. Also, the bill does not forbid plans 
from making reasonable actuarial adjustments to take appropriate ac-
count of the possibility that otherwise total costs would be increased 
because of adverse selection. 
The joint and survivor annuity requirements are to apply only to 
plans to which the new vesting requirements of this bill are applicable. 
In other words, the joint and survivor rules would not apply to govern-
ment plans, they would not apply to church plans unless an election had 
been made to come under the new rules, and the effective date in the case 
of existing plans would be delayed to the same extent that the effective 
date is delayed generally with regard to the new vesting provisions. Of 
course, the plans not subject to these provisions (or to which the new 
provisions would not apply for some years into the future) may offer joint 
and survivor options if they wish to do so. The mandatory provisions of 
the bill will not apply unless that participant's annuity starting date is on 
or after the effective date with regard to that plan and would not apply 
unless that participant was an active participant in the plan on or after 
that effective date. 
Appendix C 
Section 261(a) (2) of H.R. 4200, as passed by the Senate (Sept. 
19, 1973) and S. Rep. No. 93-383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 146 (1973). 
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"(11) A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this 
section if the plan of which such trust is a part provides for the 
payment of benefits in the form of an annuity for the life of a 
participant unless such plan provides for the payment of such 
benefit in the form of a joint and survivor annuity (with a survivor 
annuity of not less than one half of the amount of the annuity 
payable to the participant and his spouse), unless the participant 
elects in writing, within 2 years of normal retirement age (or, if 
earlier, within 2 years of the first payment of regular retirement 
benefits), not to have the benefit paid in such form and that such 
election may be made only after such participant receives a written 
explanation of the terms and conditions of such joint and survivor 
annuity and the ef ect of such election. 
1. Right to elect a survivor annuity (sec. 261 of the bill and sec. 401 
of the Code). 
Under present law, there is no requirement that a qualified retire-
ment plan must offer the option of a survivor annuity. This can result 
in a hardship where an individual primarily dependent on his pension 
as a source of retirement income is unable to make adequate provision 
for his spouse's retirement years, should he predecease her. To correct 
this situation, the committee provision requires that a joint and survivor 
annuity be offered as an option with respect to any benefit under a 
qualified retirement plan which is payable as an annuity. If the option 
is exercised, and a survivor annuity is elected, the participant's own 
annuity may be reduced, so that the value of the joint and survivor 
annuity and the value of the annuity the participant would have been 
entitled to receive had the option not been exercised are actuarially 
equivalent. 
This provision generally applies to plan years beginning after the 
date of enactment. However, in the case of a plan in existence on the 
date of enactment, the provision applies to plan years beginning after 
December 31, 1975. 
